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Pay for (Privacy) Performance
HOLDING SOCIAL NETWORK EXECUTIVES
ACCOUNTABLE FOR BREACHES IN DATA PRIVACY
PROTECTION
Lital Helman†
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade and a half, social networking online
has grown exponentially, attracting a multitude of users and
drawing an increasing volume of online activity.1 Throughout

† Senior Lecturer of Law, Ono Academic College, Israel. The author would like
to thank Sharon Hannes for insights regarding the field of executive compensation and
for help in harnessing this field to tackle contemporary privacy challenges. The author
also thanks Gideon Parchomovsky, Joel Reidenberg, James Grimmelman, Colleen
Chien, Eric Goldman, Helen Nissenbaum, Michael Birnhak, Malte Zieovitz, Miriam
Bitton, Sasha Romanovsky, Heather West, Anneleis Mores, Jos Floor, Stephen
Deadman, and Guy Pessach, as well as the participants of the New York University
Intellectual Property Faculty Workshop, the New York University Privacy Research
Group workshop, the 2015 Amsterdam Privacy Conference, the Data Transparency Lab
at the MIT Media Lab, and the 2017 Santa Clara University Works In Progress
Workshop for helpful comments.
1 Facebook, the largest social network in the world, alone reported 1.4 billion
active daily users in the fourth quarterly report of 2017. Press Release, Facebook, Facebook
Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017 Results (Jan. 31, 2018), https://investor.fb.com/
investor-news/press-release-details/2018/Facebook-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-FullYear-2017-Results/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/6Y29-KRGQ]; see also danah boyd, Social
Media: A Phenomenon to Be Analyzed, SOC. MEDIA + SOC’Y, Apr.– June 2015, at 1, 2 (“Over
the last decade, social media has gone from being a dream of Silicon Valley technologists
to a central part of contemporary digital life around the world.”); MAEVE DUGGAN ET AL.,
PEW RES. CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2014, at 2 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/
2015/01/PI_SocialMediaUpdate20144.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VGT-H79B] (noting that most
Americans use more than one social media platform, and use it increasingly more often);
Fred Stutzman, Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Silent Listeners: The Evolution of
Privacy and Disclosure on Facebook, 4 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY, no. 2, 2012, at ", 7,
https://journalprivacyconfidentiality.org/index.php/jpc/article/view/620/603 [https://
perma.cc/YD6P-9R24] (“Virtually all US teenagers use social network sites, as well as
almost half of all US online adults—an approximate five-fold increase since 2005.”); How
to Win Friends and Influence People, ECONOMIST (Apr. 9, 2016) https://
www.economist.com/briefing/2016/04/09/how-to-win-friends-and-influence-people [https://
perma.cc/8DRQ-4KGY] (noting that “22% of the internet time Americans spend on mobile
devices” is spent on Facebook).
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this growth process, social networks have amassed vast
quantities of data on individuals all over the world.2
Social networks are platforms that allow users to interact
with each other online. The business models of social networks
involve using users’ data in transactions with paying third
parties.3 Indeed, users of social network services typically pay
insignificant or no fees for their use of the services.4 Rather, they
provide data about themselves, which the service monetizes via
agreements with third parties.5 These agreements primarily
involve blending personalized ads in users’ interfaces over the
platform, based on a rigorous analysis of users’ personal data
conducted by the social network.6
Designing standards for use of personal data on social
media is a fundamental task. On the one hand, experimentation
with the new business model can enhance the use of social
networking and the value all parties receive in these
interactions.7 On the other hand, the potential harms to privacy
this data-sharing business model entails may yield a substantial
welfare loss, and in the long term create a chilling effect on
desired uses of social media.8

2 See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1384–87 (2017) (discussing the “data-as-payment model” of social
media and other types of firms).
3 See danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2008),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00393.x
[https://perma.cc/U6NW-7R3G] (defining the user-facing function of social networks as
“web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile
within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a
connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others
within the system.”).
4 Elvy, supra note 2, at 1385 (“[C]onsumers generally provide their data (and
perhaps their attention) to companies when using products that are described as ‘free.’”).
5 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of
the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 628 (2014) (discussing Facebook’s
business model); Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy
for the Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1678 (2013) (describing user data as a “[c]ritical
[a]sset”); Somini Sengupta, Facebook Posts Largest Single Day Gain, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Oct.
24, 2012, 5:03 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/facebook-posts-largest-singleday-gain-after-third-quarter-earnings-call [https://perma.cc/9QV8-DDXL] (noting that
Facebook’s revenues stem mostly from “offering marketers a chance to target tailored
advertisements . . . on what [users] reveal about themselves”).
6 See generally HOWARD BEALES, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, THE VALUE OF
BEHAVIORAL TARGETING 6–11 (2010), http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Beales_
NAI_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7K2-HNNJ] (discussing behavioral advertising); David
S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. Summer 2009, at 37, 42 (2009); Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Online
Advertising, 81 ADVANCES IN COMPUTERS 289, 292–94 (2011); Catherine E. Tucker, The
Economics of Advertising and Privacy, 30 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 326, 326 (2012).
7 See, e.g., boyd & Ellison, supra note 3 at 214–19.
8 See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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The United States has primarily employed market
solutions to tackle the challenge of social media privacy. Under
this framework, each social network firm designs its own privacy
standards, and users can select whether to use the service based,
inter alia, on these standards.9 The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) supervises this process under its authorization to regulate
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.10
As analyzed below, this approach has created a powerful
incentive for social network firms to undersupply privacy
protection. The reason for the creation of such an incentive is that
users are ill-positioned to bargain for better privacy terms on social
media, and their privacy interests are eclipsed by a powerful
competitive pressure to maximize the collection, analysis, and sale
of users’ personal data.11
Current executive compensation models exacerbate this
problem. The standard executive compensation package is a Pay
for Performance scheme, where compensation is tied to a firm’s
economic performance.12 Such compensation packages motivate
executives of social media companies to externalize the costs
associated with overexploitation of users’ data. These
compensation packages also encourage executives to take
excessive risks and pursue short- to medium-term profits—even
at the expense of the long-term interest of shareholders to
maintain users’ trust in the system.13
In this article, I propose a promising way to reverse the
incentives of social media executives to alleviate privacy abuses on
social networks—to link the executive compensation in social
network firms to the firm’s data protection practices. Concretely, I
propose to augment the classical incentive contract—in which
officers receive a fixed wage and a payment that is tied to the price
of the firm’s stock—by a payment that depends on a privacy rating.
The rating would be determined annually by measuring users’
awareness and satisfaction of the privacy practices that their social
networks deploy. Privacy officers at firms would be responsible for
See infra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012)) (commonly referred to as the FTC’s
Section 5 jurisdiction).
11 See infra Section II.A.
12 See
generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6 (2004)
(“[I]n the beginning of the 1990s, prominent financial economists such as Michael Jensen
and Kevin Murphy urged shareholders to be more accepting of large pay packages that
would provide high-powered incentives.”). For the rationale of tying agents’ economic
interests to their principals’ objectives in general, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives, Risk,
and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy, 6 BELL J. ECON. 552, 570 (1975).
13 See infra Section II.A.
9

10
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applying the model in the firm, and the compensation committee of
the firm would be tasked with incorporating this score into the
compensation of key executives.14
My proposal is different from existing proposals to fix
privacy inefficiencies in two significant ways. First, the policy is
not directly aimed at social networking firms. Rather, it is set to
influence executives within the firms by manipulating their pay
to reflect the benefits and harms that their conduct inflicts.
Second, this proposal offers a dynamic solution, where the level
of privacy protection on social networks would adapt to the
changing privacy standards of society, rather than a static policy
where privacy standards are set top-down, via legislation or
regulation, and remain constant.15
This proposal would dramatically improve privacy
protection on social media. It would compel executives to
embrace privacy considerations in their decision-making process
ex ante and would curb their incentives to surrender users’
privacy in pursuit of short-term profits. As a result, it would both
enhance the privacy protection users enjoy, and align the
interests of executives with the long-term interests of the firm to
maintain users’ trust in social networks.
Clearly, numerous other businesses besides social
networks collect users’ data, including retail businesses, network
providers, search engines, webhosts, and others. Yet social
networks comprise the only platform whose business model
revolves exclusively around enticing sharing, analyzing the
shared information, and exploiting it to the fullest with third
parties.16 In light of this business model, it is not surprising that
the scope of personal information revealed on social networking
14 See infra Section II.B. The Compensation Committee is a sub-committee of
the Board, composed of three or four independent directors. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra
note 12, at 24; see also NASD Rule 4350(c)(3); NYSE, Listed Co. Manual Rule § 303A.05,
http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4%
5F3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F [https://perma.cc/7AVTWKY2]; American Stock Exchange Company Guide §§ 121, 801–809 (2008); Order
Approving NYSE and NASDAQ Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate
Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003);
Order Approving AMEX Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-48863, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,432, (Dec. 1, 2003).
15 See generally ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION JUDGMENT
ON “GOOGLE SPAIN AND INC V. AGENCIA ESPAÑOLA DE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS (AEPD) AND
MARIO COSTEJA GONZÁLEZ” C-131/12 (2014) https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/
88502.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3DQ-QM5Y] (providing guidelines on implementing the
Right to be Forgotten in the Court of Justice of the European Union).
16 See, e.g., Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and
Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849, 865
(2014) (discussing Facebook’s and Google’s business model).
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sites is substantially greater, in both quality and quantity, than
on other platforms.17 It is also not surprising that anonymous use
or registration under fake identities are forbidden, and that
information is even collected involuntarily, generating privacy
externalities and distributive implications.18 Unlike most other
businesses, the market of social networks also tends to
consolidate, which curbs the creation of a privacy market.19 As a
result, while privacy risks occur on various types of platforms,
they are dramatically exacerbated in the social networking realm.
This article unfolds as follows. Part I explains the current
data protection law in the United States and its shortcomings in
the context of social media. In this framework, I discuss the
limits of consent mechanisms, and show that firms’ incentives to
internalize privacy concerns are curbed by substantial market
failures. I also demonstrate that data use has externalities on
other users and non-users of social media, which means that
privacy costs can be inflicted upon individuals regardless of their
conscious choice. Part II delineates the proposal and explains its
advantages. This Part explains the rationale to manipulate
executive compensation in the context of privacy protection, and
define the steps needed in order for the model to achieve the
expected advantages. Part III tackles potential objections to this
model. In this framework, I address potential manipulations of
the model, as well as the claim that privacy violations are
“victimless crimes.” This Part also explains the rationale to
harness executive compensation to improve privacy interests,
rather than to promote other societal values, and explores
potential extensions of this idea. A short conclusion ensues.
I.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES

The challenge of protecting privacy online preoccupies
lawmakers all over the world.20 The United States has, with few
See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
20 Various jurisdictions adopted a combination of legal, regulatory, and
organizational solutions. See, e.g., Graham Greenleaf, Global Data Privacy Laws 2017:
120 National Data Privacy Laws, Including Indonesia and Turkey, 145 PRIVACY LAWS &
BUS. INT’L REP. 10–13 (UNSW Law Research, Working Paper No. 17-45), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2993035 [https://perma.cc/9TF2-E88G] (“In the past two years, the
number of countries that have enacted data privacy laws has risen from 109 to 120, a
10% increase, with at least 30 more countries having official Bills for such laws in various
stages of progress.”); see also Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1–88.
Notably, the EU data protection laws have traditionally had a considerable global effect.
17
18
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exceptions, fostered self-regulation and market solutions.21
Accordingly, in most cases in the United States, individual
firms, and in some contexts, industry groups, determine their
own level of privacy protection.22
The FTC oversees this self-regulation regime, relying on its
broad powers under Section 5 of the FTC Act “to prevent . . . unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”23 Based on
this authorization, the FTC requires firms to provide users with
notice that details the firm’s data management policies, and to follow
the policies they set forth. Acting in this capacity, the FTC has also
investigated companies—including social networks—regarding
their use of user data.24 The FTC is in fact in the midst of such an
investigation with regards to the Cambridge Analytica scandal,
where Facebook compromised the data of fifty million users.25
The FTC requirements of notice and consent were translated
in the market into adopting “Privacy Policies”—documents that
describe the firm’s practices of collection and use of personal data—
and placing these documents on the firm’s website.26
See generally Michael D. Birnhack, The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a
Global Regime, 24 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REP. 508 (2008) (examining the emerging
global legal regime that attempts to regulate various aspects of personal data); see also
Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground,
63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 261 (2011) (noting that large firms have added a new C-level
position of Chief Privacy Officer to reflect internally on the firm’s privacy conduct).
21 See Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 20, at 251
(“Congress has declined to follow the European model of a dedicated privacy
administrator.”); Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of
Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (describing the
debate between self-regulation and market solutions, and privacy rights and regulation);
Dennys Marcelo Antonialli, Note, Watch Your Virtual Steps: An Empirical Study of the
Use of Online Tracking Technologies in Different Regulatory Regimes, 8 STAN. J. C.R. &
C. L. 323, 333 (2012) (“In the United States, the debate revolves around improving the
self-regulatory regime, rather than adopting a more normative framework.”).
22 Since no federal law requires privacy protection measures, the FTC can only
enforce privacy rules indirectly, via false representation. See Federal Trade Commission
Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 717–24 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58
(2012)). Examples for industry group regulation include, inter alia, the “Digital
Advertising Alliance (DAA) Self-Regulatory Program” for online behavioral advertising,
which enables users to opt out of some targeted advertising, and “www.aboutads.info,” a
partnership of public and private parties, which provides information about online
advertising. See DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE (DAA) SELF-REGULATORY PROGRAM,
http://www.aboutads.info/ [https://perma.cc/S6NG-ZTGG].
23 Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, sec. 3, § 5(a), 52 Stat. 111, 111–12 (1938)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)) (often referred to as Section 5 jurisdiction).
24 For example, in recent years, both Facebook and Google settled FTC
complaints for violating their own policies. See In re Facebook Inc., No. C-4365, 2012 WL
3518628, *3 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012); In re Google Inc., No. C-4336, 2011 WL 5089551, *7
(F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011).
25 Louise Matsakis, The FTC Is Officially Investigating Facebook’s Data
Practices, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2018, 12:05 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/ftc-facebookdata-privacy-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/ELR2-DURR].
26 See Antonialli, supra note 21, at 341 (finding that websites typically comply with
the FTC’s notice requirement by adopting a Privacy Policy). Prominent networks require
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This market-based regime has exceptions for certain areas
that are subject to stricter federal rules, such as medical or financial
information27 and information of children under thirteen years old.28
Some state laws have also taken a more interventionist approach
across the board, with some spillover effects on other states.29 Social
networks, however, generally fall outside the regulated categories,
and are thus free to design their own privacy practices, as long as
they publicize their standards and comply with them.30
The theory behind market solutions in the social
networking realm may sound rather compelling. Social networks
form two-sided platforms that connect users on the one hand and
advertisers on the other.31 See Figure 1. The best interest of social
networks, the theory goes, is to remain competitive on both sides

mobile apps to adopt privacy policies as well. See Joint Statement of Principles, Office of Att’y
Gen. Kamala D. Harris (Feb. 22, 2012), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n2630_
signed_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY63-QKAM] (joined by California Attorney General
Kamala D. Harris, Amazon, Inc., Apple, Inc., Google, Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co., Microsoft
Corp., and Research in Motion, Ltd.).
27 See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)); Federal Information Security Management Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2946, 2946–61 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3541–3549 (2012)). This “patchwork” approach to privacy regulation has attracted
critique even very early on. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in
Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1632 (1999).
28 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
112 Stat. 2681–728 (“COPPA”) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012)).
Other areas where privacy standards are predefined include, for example, limitations on
the collection of personal data by government agencies, and limits on the interception of
electronic data transmissions in the context of employment. Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. (2012)).
29 California emerges as a leader in the privacy area, focusing mainly on
limitations on data trading (rather than data collection). Part of the Californian law has
become the de-facto national standard. See, e.g., California Online Privacy Protection
Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2018) (imposing certain
requirements on privacy policies regarding California resident consumers). Further,
driven by the continued rise of consumer data breaches, California passed the California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in 2018. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
(“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798. While the CCPA is likely to undergo substantial
changes, it clearly sets to strengthen privacy protection in California, with likely
spillover to the United States as a whole.
30 To avail themselves of limitative legislation, social networks typically ban
minors from the service. Many privacy policies also refer to “California resident rights.”
See supra note 28.
31 See Claus-Georg Nolte, Christian Zimmermann, & Günter Müller, No
Privacy in Monopoly?: An Economic Perspective on Social Network Services and DataCentric Business 1 (Oct. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Shelanski,
supra note 5, 1677–78 (discussing “the multisided nature of digital platforms”). See
generally David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20
YALE J. ON REG. 325 (2003) (applying the analysis of two-sided platforms to online
platforms); Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer
Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95 (2013).
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of the market, namely, users and advertisers.32 Excessive privacy
intrusions by social networks would supposedly reduce the
demand for the service on the users’ side, by an amount exactly
related to how much users value their privacy.33 Following
sinking popularity among users, the platform’s appeal to
advertisers would plummet as well.34 This projected effect should
provide an incentive for firms to internalize users’ privacy
concerns ex ante.35 The process of weighing users’ concerns
against advertisers’ willingness to pay for personal data should in
theory yield an optimal level of privacy protection.36
Figure 1

32 See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-sided Markets: A Progress
Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 646 (2006) (“A platform’s usage or variable charges impact
the two sides’ willingness to trade once on the platform and, thereby, their net surpluses
from potential interactions; the platforms’ membership or fixed charges in turn condition
the end-users’ presence on the platform.”).
33 See Shelanski, supra note 5, at 1688–89 (noting that “holding price, service
quality, and everything else constant, digital platform customers would rather reveal less
information about themselves, and would prefer that those platforms maintain strong,
rather than weak, privacy policies regarding the data that customers do disclose”); see also
Joseph Farrell, Can Privacy Be Just Another Good?, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 251,
254–55 (2012) (modeling users’ demand as related to shifts in privacy policies).
34 As Richard Epstein explains, “in a two-sided market, the ability to attract
customers on one side of the market depends on the ability to attract those customers to
the other side of the market.” See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Paradox of the
Durbin Amendment: How Monopolies Are Offered Constitutional Protections Denied to
Competitive Firms, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1307, 1323 (2011).
35 Michael Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, Does Law Matter Online?: Empirical
Evidence on Privacy Law Compliance, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 337, 339–
40 (2011) (showing that when there is user outrage, firms respond to market demands,
or at least represent that they do).
36 See generally THOMAS M. LENERD & PAUL H. RUBIN, PRIVACY AND THE
COMMERCIAL USE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION: THE CASE OF CUSTOMER PROPRIETARY
NETWORK INFORMATION (2007) (finding a functioning market for privacy); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, 2 REG. 19, 26 (1978); Richard A. Posner, Privacy,
Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Economics
of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405 (1981); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12
GA. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978) (comparing theories of privacy).
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Reality, however, does not bear out this theory.37 Under
the current regime, it is rational for social networking firms to
undersupply privacy protection. As the theory predicts, social
networks have a powerful incentive to exploit to the fullest
personal information they retain on individuals in order to sell
advertisers a palatable product: targeting audiences with great
precision.38 The balance that the theory predicts, however, rarely
occurs: as I discuss herein, market failures make users illpositioned to bargain for privacy ex ante or to act upon privacy
harms ex post.39 Social media users are subject to information
problems and face persistent issues with assessing privacy risks
and making decisions that affect their privacy. Users also have
very little choice, considering the lack of meaningful
alternatives, coupled with the powerful societal expectation to
maintain an online presence. On top of all that, users face lockin effects, which makes backing out of social media use nearly
impossible.40 Social network firms rationally respond by favoring
advertisers’ interests for vigorous exploitation of users’ data over
a more robust privacy protection.41
A predominant market failure that prevents users from
bargaining for better privacy terms concerns information
problems.42 While the adoption of privacy policies is widespread,
37 See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 649, 663–64 (1980); H. Brian Holland, Privacy Paradox 2.0, 19 WIDENER
L.J. 893, 900–02 (2010) (doubting the functioning privacy market); Richard S. Murphy,
Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J.
2381, 2402 (1996) (“[T]he typical transaction between a merchant or seller and a
consumer increasingly can be characterized as an exchange of goods or services for
money and information.”); George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics
and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 627 (1980) (“[I]n voluntary transactions there is no
reason to interfere to protect one party provided the usual conditions of competition
prevail; the efficient amount of information will be provided in transactions, given the
tastes of the parties for knowledge and privacy.”)
38 Steven Hodson, The Great Privacy Con of Social Media and Web 2.0,
INQUISITR (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.inquisitr.com/66776/the-great-privacy-con-ofsocial-media-and-web-2-0/#rcgSyKVBecZ6ZeIZ.99 [https://perma.cc/CZT3-NTJV] (“It is
that constant flow of data that is collected, correlated, mashed up with data from other
sources and then put through a strainer for advertisers and marketers to feast upon—
for a pretty penny at that.”); see also James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 1137, 1150–51 (2009).
39 See Allen P. Grunes, Another Look at Privacy, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1107,
1112 (2013) (“Firms do compete on privacy protection . . . . But this dimension of
competition is not very widespread or intense today.”).
40 To address this concern, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)—
the most recent European regulation intended to strengthen and unify data protection
within the European Union—has a portability rule. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art.
20, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1–45.
41 See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1682–83 (discussing the “one-sided bargains
that benefit data processors”).
42 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 41 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing information asymmetries as a standard cause of market failure); Hal R.
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privacy policies are notoriously vague, uninformative and
noncommittal, they change frequently, and often require ex ante
consent to future unspecified changes in the policy.43 Privacy
settings are also complex and fine-grained, and are thus difficult
to understand and virtually impossible to use as a basis for
comparison between social networks.44
The uninformative nature of privacy policies need not
come as a surprise. Policies that detail actual data-management
practices could only harm firms’ interests. Such policies may
scare users away and limit uses of personal data if the business
model changes in the future, or if the firm merges into another
firm with a different agenda on data use.45 Informative privacy
policies would also allow the FTC to spot deviations from the
policy and would thus ironically invite more scrutiny. As a
result, firms have a powerful incentive to keep privacy policies,
in James Grimmelmann’s words, “beautiful[ly] irrelevan[t].”46

Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, in INTERNET POLICY AND ECONOMICS 101,
104 (William H. Lehr & Lorenzo Maria Pupillo eds., 2d ed. 2009) (“several of the
problems with personal privacy arise because of the lack of information available
between concerned parties.”); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1253 (1998) (“[I]ndividuals today are largely
clueless about how personal information is processed through cyberspace.”).
43 See, e.g., Michael J. Kasdan, Is Facebook Killing Privacy Softly?: The Impact
of Facebook’s Default Privacy Settings on Online Privacy, 2 N.Y.U. INTELL. PROP. & ENT.
L. LEDGER 107, 111 (2011) (discussing the 2009 change in Facebook Privacy Policy); Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to
Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S69, S92–93 (2016) (discussing the implications of the
“vague and imprecise” nature of privacy policies); James Temperton, AVG Can Sell Your
Browsing and Search History to Advertisers, WIRED (Sept. 18, 2015),
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2015-09/17/avg-privacy-policy-browser-search-data
[https://perma.cc/2G5X-PSHZ] (discussing AVG’s 2015 update of its privacy policy to
allow sale of users’ data); see also How to Win Friends and Influence People, supra note 1
(“Facebook has a history of hastily changing its privacy policy and the information it
shares in public.”).
44 See Janice Y. Tsai et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on
Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, 22 INFO. SYS. RES. 254, 254 (2011) (“70%
of people surveyed disagreed with the statement ‘privacy policies are easy to
understand’, and few people make the effort to read them.” (internal citations omitted));
see also Antonialli, supra note 21, at 343 (“[C]ompanies [have] the ability to notify users
only about what they choose to and not about what they ought to.”).
45 See Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 916 (2013)
(discussing pivots firms take after amassing large databases of users’ personal data).
Firms might also be merged into another firm with a different data use agenda. See, e.g.,
Parmy Olson, Facebook Is Committed to WhatsApp Encryption, but Could Bypass It Too,
FORBES (Sept. 27, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2018/09/27/
facebook-is-committed-to-whatsapp-encryption-but-could-bypass-it-too/#4e17488f3efe
[https://perma.cc/PT2S-7K5A] (quoting Facebook’s spokesperson following WhatsApp’s
acquisition that “there are no plan[s] to change” the encryption feature of WhatsApp, but
noting also that Facebook has ways to bypass this feature).
46 See Grimmelmann, supra note 38, at 1181.
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The irrelevance of privacy policies produces an adverse
dynamic effect as well.47 Users rationally respond to the
uninformative nature of privacy policies by not wasting time on
reading them in the first place.48 As a result, firms learn that
they cannot benefit from adopting robust privacy policies, and
draft them ever more vaguely, in turn feeding the disincentive
of users to read privacy policies.49
Other than these vague privacy policies, users have no
other way to learn about data management practices of social
networks.50 They have no way to know what information about
them has been collected, how it has been analyzed and used, and
who has access to it.51 Data collection, analytics, and sales occur
behind the scenes, and much of that activity is protected as trade
secrets.52 Nor do users know what other information firms (or
47 As Paul Ohm explains, “Ultimately, exposing users to an ever-shifting
landscape of broken promises of privacy, in which every privacy policy is inconstant,
whittles away expectations of privacy.” Ohm, supra note 45, at 926.
48 Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie F. Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies,
4 I/S J.L. & POL. 540, 565 (2008) (“[I]f Americas were to read online privacy policies wordfor-word, we estimate the value of time lost as about $781 billion annually.”).
49 See Shelanski, supra note 5 at 1690 (“If consumers cannot tell whether a
firm uses and protects data well or poorly, platforms will lack incentive to choose
comparatively pro-consumer policies.”). Counterintuitively, there is some evidence that
users “punish” firms that proactively bring privacy to the front of the conscious, even if
to enhance privacy protection or control over data. Apparently, reference to privacy
concerns raises dormant concerns. See Leslie K. John, Alessandro Acquisti, & George
Loewenstein, The Best of Strangers: Context Dependent Willingness to Divulge Personal
Information, 9–10 (July 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1430482 [https://perma.cc/783Y-QEXV] (“In situations in which privacy concerns are
activated, . . . it is likely that people will fail to divulge information even when the risks
of doing so are low . . . .”).
50 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, New Governance, Chief
Privacy Officers, and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the United
States: An Initial Inquiry, 33 LAW & POL’Y 477, 499 (2011) (citing an interview with an
executive: “I hate to say ‘what they don’t know won’t hurt them,’ but that’s really how I
see it. If we buy personal information . . . or pull some from another database, there’s
never any way the customers will know about it . . . they won’t ever be able to figure
out . . . how can they complain?” (alterations in original)).
51 Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics and Behavioral Economics of Privacy,
in PRIVACY, BIG DATA AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 76, 87
(Julia Lane, e al., eds, Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (“[A]fter an individual has released
control on her personal information, she is in a position of information asymmetry with
respect to the party with whom she is transacting. In particular, the subject might not
know if, when, and how often the information she has provided will be used.”); Paul
Sholtz, Transaction Costs and the Social Costs of Online Privacy, FIRST MONDAY, (May
7, 2001), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/859/768#note16 [https://
perma.cc/9ZRE-G6JY] (“In general, a company will know a good deal more about how it
uses the personal information it collects than individual consumers will.”). See generally
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (discussing how powerful interests in the online
business abuse users’ secrecy for profit).
52 For example, the identity of third parties’ partners who access users’ data
as well as the practices of collection and analysis the firm deploys can be protected under
trade secrecy if the firm makes an effort to keep it confidential. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS

534

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

their third party partners) possess about them from other
sources, in order to estimate the risks involved in adding more
information to this pool.53 Data collection and data analytics
technologies also progress at an overwhelming speed, enabling
social networks to learn more sensitive information from less
active information sharing by users, and obstructing users’
ability to make sense of the data firms hold about them.54
Worse yet, as startling as it may sound, in many cases,
social networks themselves do not know what information they
are collecting and how they are going to use that information.55
The decline of storage costs and the simultaneous shift to datacentric business models have prompted even small companies to
collect data first, and decide what to do with it later.56
Not only are users unaware of firms’ data management
practices, but the risks involved are also not salient to them.57
ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. at 538 (2005) (amended 1985) (defining trade secrets); see also
Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
owner of the alleged secret “was required to take efforts ‘reasonable under the
circumstances’ to maintain the secrecy of its customer information.”); FMC Corp. v.
Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 62–64 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (same).
53 See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and
Externalities, I/S J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 425, 443 (2011) (“Collectors of information
know what can be done with it or how it can be combined with other pieces of information
to create profiles that have substantial economic value. Data subjects typically have no
such knowledge and it is unreasonable to expect them to acquire it.”). Note also that
social networks often use cookies to track users’ behavior on other websites. See, e.g.,
Cookies & Other Storage Technologies, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policies/
cookies/ [https://perma.cc/4Y2Y-ZJL3].
54 See, e.g., Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, Private Traits
and Attributes are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCIS. 5802, 5805 (2013) (finding that mere “likes” on social networks can predict
users’ sexual orientation, ethnicity, personality traits, political leanings, religion,
personality, intelligence, substance use, satisfaction with life, and whether her parents
divorced); see also infra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
55 See Cadie Thompson, Companies Aim to Cash in on Your Intimate Social
Data, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2013, 2:37 PM EDT), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101151899
[https://perma.cc/E2F8-MBHT] (quoting Justin Brookman, director of consumer privacy
for the Center for Democracy and Technology: “With big data there’s this idea that
everyone out there wants to collect it, but they don’t know what to do with it. They
basically say, ‘We have the right to collect this data on behalf of our client and we’ll figure
out what to do with it later.’”).
56 Thompson, supra note 55. The fact that firms do not know why they collect
the data is disturbing, inter alia, because users’ consent to data use may depend on these
reasons. See, e.g., Jialiu Lin, Bin Liu, Norman Sadeh, & Jason I. Hong, Modeling Users’
Mobile App Privacy Preferences: Restoring Usability in a Sea of Permission Settings, in
PROC. OF THE TENTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY at 199, 200–01
(2014) https://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/soups14_proceedings.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4KC2-NRKK] (using the purpose of the use as a parameter in evaluating the
privacy performance of Android apps).
57 See, e.g., Daniel Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883–88 (2013) (exploring difficulties with assessing
privacy risks); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control
of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1052–53 (1999) (discussing problems with
assessing privacy costs); Richard Warner, Undermined Norms: The Corrosive Effect of
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Privacy is a “credence good,” the qualities of which cannot be
properly assessed.58 Users often do not know what it is that they
are giving up and what value their data entails.59 Consider also
that users’ imagination is restricted to familiar risks. For
example, they may understand that they subject themselves to
targeted ads on the social networking website, but miss the fact
that their data is stored and analyzed, and is then shared with
data brokers and unaffiliated third parties,60 and may be put to
unpredictable uses in the future.61
But merely fixing information and saliency problems
would be insufficient (if at all possible). Users are not likely to act
upon the information, even when the facts and risks are known to
them. A main reason for that is that users are subject to various
lock-in effects. Consider network effects.62 The user side of the
social media platform is characterized by strong network effects,
because more users on the network provide more people to
interact with, and thus increase the value of the network for all
users.63 Such network effects do not occur on the advertisers’ side
Information Processing Technology on Informational Privacy, 55 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1047, 1084–
86 (2011) (questioning the concept of consent as a privacy safeguard).
58 See generally Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the
Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68–69 (1973) (distinguishing “credence
goods” and the “credence qualities of goods” as qualities which “cannot be [easily]
evaluated in normal use”); Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics,
and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 5–6
(2006) (“Goods and services where an expert knows more about the quality a consumer
needs than the consumer himself are called credence goods.”).
59 See Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (2012) (stating that individuals have difficulty in determining
the value of the data they are trading and the costs to which they expose themselves).
60 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COM., SCI. & TRANSP., 113TH CONG., A REVIEW OF
THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR
MARKETING PURPOSES 1 (2013) (reporting that established data brokers play a key role
in the market for consumer data).
61 See, e.g., What Do Your Social Media Posts Reveal About Your Health?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Apr. 25, 2016) http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/
what-do-your-social-media-posts-reveal-about-your-health/ [https://perma.cc/M3AP-S
CVM] (showing how an analysis of social media posts can later be used to learn of health
conditions users may have); see also Ted Ullyot, Facebook Releases Data, Including All
National Security Requests, FACEBOOK (June 14, 2013), http://newsroom.fb.com/News/636/
Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-Security-Requests [https://perma.cc/
Z8D6-BD99] (showing how users’ data may be shared with non-commercial bodies, such as
the government); Kosinski et al., supra note 54.
62 See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, System Competition and
Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994) (discussing the economics of network effects).
63 Alexandra Gebicka & Andreas Heinemann, Social Media & Competition
Law, 37 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 149, 161 (2014); see also OZ SHY, THE
ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 3 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004) (explaining that
the utility of a network product “is affected by the number of people using similar or
compatible products.”); Miguel Rato & Nicholas Petit, Abuse of Dominance in TechnologyEnabled Markets: Established Standards Reconsidered?, 9 EUR. COMPETITION J. 1, 4 (2013)
(discussing Metcalfe’s Law, according to which the total value of a network to users is
proportional to the square of the total user count).
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of the market. In fact, advertisers are rivals to one another, as
they compete among themselves for advertisement space.64 See
Figure 2. The network effects among users bind users to the
network and discourage abandonment of the network. In
contrast, the rivalry between advertisers on the network negates
such an effect on the advertisers’ side of the platform. This
asymmetry tilts social networks’ incentives towards satisfying
advertisers, who are more likely to otherwise shift to competitors.
Figure 2

Network effects are reinforced by switching costs, which
are particularly high for social media users.65 Indeed, shifting to
a new network implies not only wasting time on rebuilding digital
identities and reestablishing networks,66 but also an inferior
experience for users, so long as their contacts remain in the “old”
service. What is more, information that has been provided on the
former service may not be fully deleted upon switching to a

64 See, e.g., Giacomo Luchetta, Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market?, 10
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON., 185, 202 (2013) (describing the internal bidding system on
online platforms, in particular on Google). Indirect network effects may exist also
between the user side of the network and its advertisers’ side, namely—the higher the
number of users, the more lucrative the platform for advertisers. This effect is produced
because a large number of users promises a broader audience for targeted
advertisements. It can also be argued that indirect network effects exist between
advertisers and users because users would prefer to see increasingly diverse
advertisements. There is, however, little proof that advertisements are a desired feature
of social networking for users.
65 See generally Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In:
Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 1970 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007) (discussing the
competitive effects of switching costs).
66 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 32 (2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau
-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/101201privacyrepo
rt.pdf [https://perma.cc/34WR-WGSJ] [hereinafter FTC 2010 REPORT] (“[A] consumer who
‘walks away’ from a social networking site because of privacy concerns loses the time and
effort invested in building a profile and connecting with friends.”).
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substitute.67 This represents a “past action” catch: users may stay
with the network even if they are dissatisfied with its privacy
standards, simply because returning to anonymity is not an
option, and switching would only duplicate the number of players
who hold information about them.68 Users are also not likely to
switch because social networks are to a large extent “experience
goods”—difficult to judge without actual use.69 Thus, once a user
has begun using a platform, she would find it difficult to even
assess the alternatives. On top of all that, users face collective
action and other coordination problems that prevent them from
negotiating for better privacy terms.70 Paul Ohm has cautioned
that lock-in effects can be used strategically by firms, by way of
offering robust privacy safeguards initially and changing them
unfavorably after users are locked in.71
Some commentators have also observed that users do not
have much of a choice, but to own a social media account and
67 See, e.g., Privacy Policy, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacypolicy [https://perma.cc/YQP4-KYEE] (“We retain your personal data even after you have
closed your account if reasonably necessary to comply with our legal obligations
(including law enforcement requests), meet regulatory requirements, resolve disputes,
maintain security, prevent fraud and abuse, enforce our User Agreement, or fulfill your
request to ‘unsubscribe’ from further messages from us. We will retain de-personalized
information after your account has been closed.”). Even social networks that do provide
a full delete option may keep information that relates to other users who select to
maintain it. See, e.g., How Do I Permanently Delete My Facebook Account?, FACEBOOK
HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/www/224562897555674?helpref=faq_content
[https://perma.cc/6X5R-PX5E] (noting that “[s]ome information, like messages you sent
to friends, may still be visible to them after you delete your account. Copies of messages
you have sent are stored in your friends’ inboxes.”).
68 Considering that most users join a social network when they are young and
less sensitive to privacy risks (and risks generally), users’ choices may reflect past
preferences, if anything. See, e.g., Jacqueline Howard, What’s the Average Age When Kids
Get a Social Media Account?, CNN (June 22, 2018, 2:22 PM GMT) https://edition.cnn.com/
2018/06/22/health/social-media-for-kids-parent-curve/index.html [https://perma.cc/W9584AMF]. The Right to be Forgotten, fostered by the European Commission, provides a
partial solution. See supra note 40 art. 17. Similarly, a recent California law allows minors
to erase content they post. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22580–22582 (West 2019).
69 See Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON.
311, 312–14 (1970) (contrasting experience goods with search goods).
70 See, e.g., SAMUEL BOWLES, MICROECONOMICS 127–66 (Princeton Univ. Press
2004) (exploring when players are better off when taking similar actions); MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
33–36, 43–52, 124–31 (4th ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1974). Occasionally, social network
users were able to push back on planned data use. See, e.g., David Coursey, After Criticism,
Facebook Tweaks Friends List Privacy Options, PC WORLD (Dec. 10, 2009, 6:17 PM PT), http://
www.pcworld.com/article/184418/After_Criticism_Facebook_Changes_Friend_List_Privacy_
Options.html [http://perma.cc/BBG9-HV4D] (reporting that following users’ outrage,
Facebook gave users the opportunity to protect their Friends List from public view); Kashmir
Hill, Instagram Cowed by Privacy Outrage, Won’t Put Photos in Ads, FORBES (Dec. 18,
2012, 5:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/12/18/instagram-cowedby-privacy-outrage-wont-put-photos-in-ads/ [https://perma.cc/Y97U-MSF9] (reporting
that users’ indignation caused Instagram to reverse a planned privacy change).
71 Ohm, supra note 45, at 922.
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submit to the terms the network sets.72 In a world where online
presence is unescapable, social networks provide an online
presence that individuals can control.73 What is more, avoiding
social media is becoming increasingly impractical. Increasingly,
potential employers, dating partners, university admission
committees and others use social media to learn about
candidates.74 Access to certain services is also becoming
conditioned upon possessing a social media account.75
But even if opting out of social media were a valid
“choice,” various cognitive biases induce users to make
disinterested choices in this regard. These biases include, inter
alia, optimism bias,76 limited foresight perspective,77 crowd
72 See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 31, at 164–65 (discussing the “take it or leave
it” nature of online privacy deals). See generally JOSEPH TUROW, MICHAEL HENNESSY &
NORA DRAPER, THE TRADEOFF FALLACY: HOW MARKETERS ARE MISREPRESENTING
AMERICAN CONSUMERS AND OPENING THEM UP TO EXPLOITATION 3 (2015) (explaining
users’ putting up with privacy-invasive practices not by a theory of willful choice, but by a
theory of resignation, namely, a belief that an “undesirable outcome is inevitable” and a
feeling of helplessness to change it).
73 See Mitja D. Back et al., Facebook Profiles Reflect Actual Personality, Not
Self-Idealization, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 372, 372 (2010) (noting that social networking sites
“have become integrated into the milieu of modern-day social interactions”). Of course,
technically, “Nobody’s got to use the Internet, at all”, as some rhetoricians like to point
out. Kate Cox, Killing Privacy Is Fine Because “Nobody’s Got to Use the Internet,” House
Rep Says, CONSUMERIST (Apr. 17, 2017, 11:38 AM EDT), https://consumerist.com/2017/
04/17/killing-privacy-is-fine-because-nobodys-got-to-use-the-internet-house-rep-says/
[https://perma.cc/N499-96FL] (quoting Wisconsin Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
74 See Alessandro Acquisti & Christina M. Fong, An Experiment in Hiring
Discrimination via Online Social Networks 2 (July 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031979 [https://perma.cc/MSD5-C96T] (finding that
employers use social media to screen applicants, including on discriminatory features);
see also Martha C. White, More Colleges are Cyber-Stalking Students During the
Admissions Process, TIME (Mar. 9, 2016), http://time.com/money/4252541/collegesfacebook-social-media-students-admissions/ [https://perma.cc/23CK-RW2B] (reporting a
survey where 45% of admissions officers reported searching online for school applicants).
75 Alessandro Acquisti et al., What Is Privacy Worth? 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249,
257 (2013) (“[I]n some cases, consumers can get access to certain goods or services (such
as listening to music on Spotify or commenting on news stories on the Los Angeles
Times’s Web site) only through a social network that tracks their behavior and links it
to their actual identities (Facebook).” (footnotes omitted)).
76 See generally TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY
POSITIVE BRAIN (2011) (explaining optimism bias as an underestimation of risks);
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1524 (1998); Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Beyond Liability: Correcting Optimism
Bias Through Tort Law, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 47, 48 (2009); Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases
About Personal Risks, 246 SCIENCE 1232 (1989); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism
About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980).
77 See Philippe Jehiel & Andrew Lilico, Smoking Today and Stopping Tomorrow:
A Limited Foresight Perspective 4–8 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2603, 2009) (explaining
limited foresight as overvaluing immediate over long term consequences); Diana I. Tamir
& Jason P. Mitchell, Disclosing Information About the Self Is Intrinsically Rewarding, 109
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8038, 8038 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
3361411/pdf/pnas.201202129.pdf [https://perma.cc/G26F-WKPT] (showing how sharing
information provides immediate gratification).
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bias,78 “bounded rationality,”79 loss aversion,80 and the lure of
“free.”81 Social media has also become addictive,82 and its user
interface is carefully designed to imitate and revoke intimacy,
coziness, safety, and trust, in order to induce sharing.83 Selfcontrol bias plays a significant role as well.84 Leading social
networks moved to allow users to restrict the visibility of their
content to other users.85 This move produced a sense of control
over information visibility and obscured the fact that the social
network itself is a “silent listener” to all the communications on
the network.86 These—and other87—biases allow firms to exploit
the gap between privacy choices that a rational user would make
and those made by an actual user with predictable flaws.88 In
78 See Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John & George Loewenstein, The Impact of
Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose, 49 J. MKTG. RES. 160, 172 (2012) (finding
that individuals are more likely to disclose information if told that others have done the same).
79 Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic Commerce, supra note 51, at 22 (“[B]ounded
rationality refers to the inability to calculate and compare the magnitudes of payoffs
associated with various strategies the individual may choose in privacy-sensitive
situations. It also refers to the inability to process all the stochastic information related
to risks and probabilities of events leading to privacy costs and benefits.”).
80 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979) (defining loss aversion as the
disproportionate weight that people tend to place on losses relative to gains).
81 See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 5, at 628.
82 See Manya Sleeper et al., I Would Like To . . . , I Shouldn’t . . . , I Wish I . . . :
Exploring Behavior-Change Goals for Social Networking Sites, in 18 ACM CONFERENCE ON
COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK & SOCIAL COMPUTING 1058, 1061 (2015) (finding
that 31% of survey participants wish to use their social networking less; 41% on Facebook).
83 Thomas Hughes-Roberts & Elahe Kani-Zabihi, On-Line Privacy Behavior:
Using User Interfaces for Salient Factors, 2 J. COMPUTER & COMMS. 220, 227–28 (2014)
(exploring the role of “persuasive technology” social media use in triggering sharing); see
also SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD
WORRY) 84 (2011) (discussing, in the context of Google, how “in the end, policies matter
less than design choices. With Google, the design of the system rigs it in favor of the
interests of the company and against the interests of users.”).
84 Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control
Paradox, 4 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 340, 345 (2012) (finding that the more
perceived control users have over sharing, the less cautious they become).
85 On
the privacy harms social media creates between users, see
Grimmelmann, supra note 38, at 1164–78.
86 Stutzman et al., supra note 1, at 9 (“[P]erceptions of control over personal data
and misdirection of users’ attention have been linked in the literature to increases in
disclosures of sensitive information to strangers.” (internal citations omitted)); Andrew
Besmer & Heather Richter Lipford, Users’ (Mis)Conceptions of Social Applications,
GRAPHICS INTERFACE 2010 63, 70 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b5e4/fb0eec3457c
acf24ddfa0e6d38e98975edec.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q9E-Q6R7] (“[P]rivacy concerns
are centered around sharing data with other people on the social network, with almost no
understanding of the data sharing that occurs with the application developers.”).
87 See, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination,
116 Q. J. ECON. 121, 125–26 (2001) (discussing context-based decision-making and
hyperbolic discounting); Holland, supra note 37, at 893–94 (applying theories from
behavioral economics to the privacy context).
88 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 999
(2014); see also Sam Levin, Facebook Told Advertisers it Can Identify Teens Feeling
‘Insecure’ and ‘Worthless’, GUARDIAN (May 1, 2017, 3:01 PM EDT), https://
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Oren Bar-Gill’s terminology, these disinterested choices form a
behavioral market failure—“a persistent consumer mistake that
causes substantial welfare loss.”89
Worse yet, even when users do make acceptable privacy
decisions for themselves, privacy decisions that they make
individually impose externalities on other users and on society
as a whole.90 The most obvious externality occurs when
information voluntarily disclosed by one individual is used to
infer information about others.91 Improved data science
methodologies allow social networks to tease out intimate
information about users from the online behavior of their
contacts (“friends”).92 For example, an individual whose contacts
are involved in a certain political party, gay community, or a
“foodies” forum (or whose behavior shows similarities to
members of such groups) may be flagged as having those traits
even if the user herself has selected to remain silent on such
matters.93 In other words, data collection on social networks
produces exponential externalities by exposing to risks more
than just the individual who is directly tracked.94
www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/01/facebook-advertising-data-insecure-teens
[https://perma.cc/2N8U-CSEV].
89 Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers about Themselves, 3
ERASMUS L. REV. 93, 119 (2010) (discussing use pattern mistakes consumers make); see
also Oren Bar-Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection: A Behavioral Economics
Account, in THE PROS AND CONS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 12–43 (Sten Nyberg, ed.,
Swedish Competition Auth. 2012); Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral
Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1842–52 (2013) (identifying present
bias and time inconsistency, ignoring shrouded attributes, unrealistic optimism, and
probability problems as forms of behavioral market failure).
90 This point has traditionally been overlooked by lawmakers in the United
States. See JAMES P. NEHF, OPEN BOOK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF INFORMATION PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 4 (2012) (“In the United States, information privacy has historically been defined
as an individual concern rather than a general societal value or a public interest problem.”).
91 See Grimmelmann, supra note 38, at 1150, 1174–75; see also Dennis D.
Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from
Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2006) (discussing how privacy-related
externalities are similar to environmental externalities).
92 See, e.g., Authorization and Authentication Based on an Individual’s Social
Network, U.S. Patent No. 9,391,971 B2 (filed May 29, 2014) (issued July 12, 2016) (“In a
fourth embodiment of the invention, the service provider is a lender. When an individual
applies for a loan, the lender examines the credit ratings of members of the individual’s
social network who are connected to the individual through authorized nodes. If the
average credit rating of these members is at least a minimum credit score, the lender
continues to process the loan application. Otherwise, the loan application is rejected.”).
93 See MacCarthy, supra note 53, at 445–46 (noting that social networks learn
about users from others mentioning their names, “tagging” them in photos, writing to or
about them, or inviting them to events); see also Matthew Moore, Gay Men ‘Can Be
Identified by Their Facebook Friends’, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 21, 2009, 10:45 AM BST),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/6213590/Gay-men-can-be-identified-by
-their-Facebook-friends.html [https://perma.cc/T2NW-2N3S].
94 See MacCarthy, supra note 53, at 443 (“The idea is that individual choice in
this area would lead, in a piecemeal fashion, to the erosion of privacy protections that
are the foundation of the democratic regime, which is the heart of our political system.
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Clearly, better privacy competition between social
networks could have alleviated many of these problems. Yet
privacy competition is rarely the case on social media, for two
main reasons. First, social networks face fierce competition on
advertisers.95 As long as the “economy of free” controls online
services, digital market players eschew charging users for
services, and instead leverage data for transactions with third
parties. This phenomenon, labeled by Paul Ohm and others “the
‘Google envy’ effect,”96 induces a rush to the bottom in terms of
privacy protection, as firms are compelled to constantly race to
collect and analyze data on their users.97 To stay ahead, social
networks must exploit to the fullest the scope of personal
information they retain on individuals, rather than to offer
stronger privacy protection that would limit their use of users’
data.98 Of course, social networks need to compete for users too,
but this need is attenuated due to the lock-in effects and the
other market failures discussed in this Part, and generally
revolves around features other than privacy, such as network
size and usability.99
Second, powerful network effects and other lock-in effects
that this Part discussed have made the market power of
dominant social networks more durable and have spurred the
creation of monopolies in the social networking space.100 Besides
Individuals are making an assessment—at least implicitly—of the advantages and
disadvantages to them of sharing information. They are determining that information
sharing is, on balance, a net gain for them. But the aggregate effect of these decisions is
to erode the expectation of privacy and also the role of privacy in fostering selfdevelopment, personhood, and other values that underlie the liberal way of life.”
(footnotes omitted)).
95 See Ohm, Branding Privacy, supra note 45, at 927 (“Many companies are
actively reshaping their business models to try to profit from customer secrets, and by
doing this, they find themselves in a large, diverse market, squaring off against
competitors from what used to be non-competitive market segments.”).
96 Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1417, 1426 (2009) (“Providers have what some have called ‘Google envy.’ Google has
demonstrated how to grow rapidly by monetizing user behavior, in their case by
displaying advertisements matching a users’ recent search queries.” (footnotes omitted)).
97 See Grunes, supra note 39, at 1118 (“[A]ntitrust law does not regard this
form of competition as particularly worthy of protection, including the fact that the
competition is on the free side and not the paying side of the market.”).
98 Social networks possess other competitive advantages for marketers at the
expense of user privacy. As discussed herein, they typically forbid anonymous use, they can
use information about past users, and they can infer information about users who have not
revealed information voluntarily. See infra Section III.C; see also Grimmelmann, supra
note 38, at 1150, 1174–75.
99 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003) (“Because buyers are boundedly
rational rather than fully rational decisionmakers, when making purchasing decisions they
take into account only a limited number of product attributes and ignore others.”).
100 See generally Nolte et al., supra note 31 (illustrating the dominant position
of some social networks). Firms also maintain their dominant positions by buying out
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potential antitrust concerns, this dynamic also feeds the
disincentive of social networks to improve their privacy offerings
to users and discourage the creation of a privacy market.101
The reality under the current regime is inefficient. Firms’
incentive to adopt a less robust privacy regime stems not from
higher gains data collection yields relative to the harms it
generates for users, which would mean that this practice passed
a real market test. Rather, this effect is achieved because firms
realize that their privacy practices will not shift demand even if
they do reduce users’ welfare. Firms therefore conclude that
their best strategy is to pursue higher gains from users’
information, regardless of the harms this strategy inflicts. As
Brian Holland put it, under the extant regime, social networks
are “able to internalize the benefits of personal data while
externalizing most of the costs.”102
II.

THE PROPOSAL

This Part of the article will delineate the proposal to
harness executive pay to improve data management practices in
social networking enterprises. My vision is to add another
component to the classic executive contract, which is typically
composed of a fixed wage and a performance bonus. This new
component, the “privacy performance” pay, would depend on a
privacy-protection score.
The first Section below explains the rationale to manipulate
executive compensation in this context. The second Section details
the mechanism for the implementation of the proposal and the
steps necessary to make it work efficiently. The third Section
explores the benefits this model encompasses and shows that
adding the proposed incentive payment is welfare improving.
A.

Why Executive Compensation?

Since the 1990s, performance-based compensation has
become the leading structure of executive compensation.103 As
competitors, such as the recent purchases of WhatsApp and Instagram by Facebook. See,
e.g., Olson, supra note 45 (discussing aspects of the WhatsApp acquisition).
101 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
102 See Holland, supra note 37, at 904.
103 Performance-based compensation is also exempted from the prohibition of
deduction of executive compensation in excess of $1 million. See I.R.C. §§ 162(m)(1)–
(4)(C)(2012) (“Certain excessive employee remuneration . . . no deduction shall be
allowed under this chapter for applicable employee remuneration with respect to any
covered employee to the extent that the amount of such remuneration for the taxable
year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000,” unless certain performance
based goals apply.); see also id. § 280G (regulating Golden Parachute Payments). After
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their name implies, “Pay for Performance” programs link
executive compensation to the firm’s economic performance.
Normally, compensation deals are composed of a fixed wage and
a bonus that depends on the firm’s stock performance. The idea
behind performance-based compensation is to align the interests
of executives with that of shareholders, in order to maximize
stock value.104
Pay for Performance schemes have been subject to
criticisms for two main reasons. First, scholars have argued that
such schemes are ineffective in achieving their goal to promote
shareholders’ interests.105 Second, critics observed that these
schemes motivate executives to externalize costs to society in the
pursuit of boosting the share price.106
These flaws of the Pay for Performance model strongly
manifest themselves in the context of social media privacy. As
discussed below, executive compensation packages create an
agency problem, because they motivate executives to pursue
short-term profits at the expense of the shareholders’ long-term
interest in maintaining trust in the system.107 Such
compensation schemes also encourage social media executives to
externalize the costs associated with overexploitation of users’
data to users and to society as a whole. Augmenting the
standard executive compensation deal in social media firms with
a payment that reflects the firm’s level of privacy protection
would address both these inefficiencies.
Consider first how manipulating executive compensation
can tackle the agency problem between executives and long-term
shareholders. Despite current users’ fatigue, privacy concerns may
eventually create a chilling effect on the use of social media.108
the recent financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 aimed to embed “pay for
performance” firmly into federal law. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1907 (2010).
104 Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of
Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 273 (1999) (“The theory of pay for
performance is that shareholders benefit when management compensation . . . is
dependent on a high level of corporate performance.”).
105 See, e.g., Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Paying High for Low
Performance 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 14, 19 (2016) (showing that there is no
correlation between the compensation executives receive and the actual state of their
firm); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 752
(2002) (criticizing the prevalent U.S. executive compensation model); Meredith M. Stead,
How Incentive Pay for Executives Isn’t—and What We Can Do About It, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
722, 724 (2005) (arguing that both equity and non-equity based compensation in its
current form fail to effectively tie compensation to performance).
106 See infra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
107 See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
108 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 8 (2012)
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While using social media extensively, users do find social media
privacy practices objectionable. A recent study by Pew Center
found that eighty percent of social networking users said that they
were concerned that some of the information they share on social
networking sites might be accessed by third parties like advertisers
or businesses without their knowledge.109 In another study at the
University of Pennsylvania, ninety-one percent of respondents
disagreed (seventy-seven percent of them strongly) that “[i]f
companies give me a discount, it is a fair exchange for them to
collect information about me without my knowing.”110
Users also employ a range of strategies in an attempt to
protect their privacy. Studies documented privacy-seeking
behaviors such as adopting of technical protections, arranging
privacy settings within social media sites, using fake profiles, and
practicing “self-censorship and withdrawal of content.”111 Some
reports also show that Facebook users have shifted from sharing
(“[Privacy protections] not only will help consumers but also will benefit businesses by
building consumer trust in the marketplace.”); Data Privacy Is a Major Concern for
Consumers, TRUSTARC BLOG (Jan. 28. 2015), http://www.truste.com/blog/2015/01/28/
data-privacy-concern-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/S3GK-8H73] (citing surveys that
show that “[c]onsumers consider data privacy to be a hot button issue.”); Leslie Harris,
The Best Practices Act of 2010 and Other Federal Privacy Legislation, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. 1 (July 22, 2010), http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT_privacy_
bill_.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S7B-WL53] (“Privacy is an essential building block of trust
in the digital age.”); Samantha Murphy Kelly, Facebook’s Facial-Recognition Acquisition
Raises Privacy Concerns, MASHABLE (June 25, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/06/25/
facebook-facial-recognition-privac/ [https://perma.cc/ZV6M-N6CT] (“[S]ome users might
exercise more caution with how they upload pictures.”); John Rose et al., The Trust
Advantage: How to Win with Big Data, BOS. CONSULTING GROUP (Nov. 6, 2013),
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/information_technology_strategy_con
sumer_products_trust_advantage_win_big_data/ [https://perma.cc/54S9-QFJJ] (“In
order for global companies to have the greatest possible access to personal data,
consumers need to trust that this information will be well stewarded.”) Press Release,
Carnegie Mellon Univ., Increasing Control over Release of Information Leads People to
Divulge More Online, Carnegie Mellon Researchers Find (Nov. 28, 2012), https://
www.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2012/november/nov28_informationcontrol.html
[https://perma.cc/356K-JTEV].
109 Mary Madden, Few Feel that the Government or Advertisers Can Be Trusted,
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/few-feel-thatthe-government-or-advertisers-can-be-trusted/ [https://perma.cc/7PKN-BCRE].
110 See Turow et al., supra note 72, at 3.
111 Stutzman et al., supra note 1, at 10 (individuals engage in “self-censorship
and withdrawal of content”); see, e.g., Kevin Lewis, Jason Kaufman & Nicholas
Christakis, The Taste for Privacy: An Analysis of College Student Privacy Settings in an
Online Social Network, 14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 79, 79–83; Jonathan Mayer,
Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570, 576 (“Individuals and businesses are rapidly
adopting technical protections . . . .”); danah boyd & Eszter Hargittai, Facebook Privacy
Settings: Who Cares?, 15 FIRST MONDAY (2010), https://firstmonday.org/article/view/
3086/2589 [https://perma.cc/PL64-P46X] (finding an increase in youth’s practices to
modify privacy settings on Facebook between 2009–2010); see also Michael E. Lackey &
Joseph P. Minta, The Ethics Of Disguised Identity In Social Media, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 447, 458–59 (2014) (discussing the use of disguised identities on social media);
Caveat Emptor.com, ECONOMIST (June 30, 2012) (discussing measures for consumers to
avoid personalized price discrimination).
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personal, original information to sharing secondary information,
such as articles and news reports.112 Also, younger users are
increasingly quitting Facebook and joining more private options,
such as Snapchat and WhatsApp. Indeed, Snapchat and
WhatsApp are only more private among the community of users
and not in the relationships of users with the network itself; yet
this trend indicates that users are not as privacy-indifferent as
some would like to believe. At the end of the day, over-exploiting
users’ privacy may jeopardize the trust individuals have in social
media and in the data-centric business model.113
Social networks can compensate for some decline in data
sharing by tracking users’ behaviors on other platforms114 and by
utilizing increasingly aggressive data analytics technologies.115
But these strategies cannot be counted on forever, and in the long
run they may exacerbate users’ privacy concerns. Increasing
public unrest around privacy can also prompt regulation, which
will impose limitations on social networks’ data practices.116
Granted, the risks that users would detrimentally change
their sharing patterns (or that regulators would step in to protect
them) will not necessarily materialize, whether due to the lock-in
effects I explored in Part I or for any other reason. Yet, this is a
112 Sarah Frier, Facebook Wants You to Post More About Yourself, BLOOMBERG
TECH. (Apr. 7, 2016, 4:36 PM EDT) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0407/facebook-said-to-face-decline-in-people-posting-personal-content [https://perma.cc/
HQD5-YR7K] (noting that personal sharing on Facebook has declined by 21%). Note,
however, that alternative explanations for this decline include growing number of
contacts Facebook users have or migration of content to other social networks. Id.
113 See sources cited supra notes 108–109.
114 See MacCarthy, supra note 53, at 500–02; Cookies & Other Storage
Technologies, supra note 53. Note also that M&A strategies in the industry can allow
social network to share data across platforms, such as Facebook’s purchases of
Instagram and WhatsApp. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 45 (discussing aspects of the
WhatsApp acquisition).
115 See Kosinki et al., supra note 54.
116 For possible regulations, see, e.g., Biometric Information Privacy Act
(BIPA), 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5–15 (2008); Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp.
3d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying Shutterfly’s motion to dismiss a case that argues
that scanning a face geometry without consent is a violation of BIPA); EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 7
(2012), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=700959 [https://perma.cc/4VMW-D7P2] (noting
a consumer privacy bill of rights, enforceable codes of conduct, and increased FTC
enforcement, as paths toward improved consumer data privacy); see also General Data
Protection Regulation, supra note 40. In Europe, the first EU directive was drafted
already in 2015. See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,
24 Oct. 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31–50; see also Protection
of Personal Data, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-developmentcooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/know-your-rights/freedoms/protectionpersonal-data_en [https://perma.cc/GPF9-Y4KW]. The more comprehensive regulation of
the GDPR was adopted in 2016. See supra note 40.
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plausible scenario, considering the level of unease users express
regarding the current state of affairs, and the early signs of
change in sharing patterns.117 Despite the plausibility of these
risks, however, executives cannot be trusted to internalize and
mitigate them. The first reason for that is that structuring
officers’ incentives to maximize shareholder value inherently
encourages excessive risk taking.118 Under this compensation
framework, executives are rewarded for high performance, but
are not penalized for low performance. “The asymmetry between
the high rewards for success and the low [penalty for] failure”
motivates executives to assume risks in the hopes of personal and
corporate gain if they do not materialize.119 In the case of social
network privacy, executives are prone to take the risk of overuse
of personal data for the gains the data use yields.120 This risky
attitude is intensified because contending with the long-term risk
of users’ trust requires sacrifices in the short-term accounting
metrics, to which officers’ pay is tied.121
There are also good reasons to believe that executives
systematically underestimate the risk that users will eventually
act upon privacy harms. The first reason for that is the notorious
optimism bias that was mentioned above in a different context.122
Optimism bias can make officers underestimate the likelihood
that users would lose trust in the platform or that regulators
would make substantial changes to the status quo. The second
117 See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text; see also HELEN
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF
SOCIAL LIFE 7 (2010) (“As the privacy conundrum has grown in public awareness it has
attracted the attention of leaders in all social sectors, including business, government,
and education, as well as scholars and researchers across the disciplines.”).
118 See Eric D. Chason, The Uneasy Case for Deferring Banker Pay, 73 LA. L.
REV. 923, 925 (2013) (arguing that changes for incentive-based compensation in the
financial industry are crucial to curb risky behavior); Lisa M. Fairfax, Government
Governance and the Need to Reconcile Governmental Regulation with Board Fiduciary
Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1692, 1696 (2011) (arguing that the current corporate
compensation structures incentivized executives to take excessive risks); Jeffrey Manns,
Insuring Against a Derivative Disaster: The Case for Decentralized Risk Management, 98
IOWA L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2013) (proposing a strategy for decentralized risk management
to tackle financial bubbles).
119 Chason, supra note 118, at 926.
120 See MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RES. CTR., AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES
ABOUT PRIVACY, SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE 8 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/
2015/05/Privacy-and-Security-Attitudes-5.19.15_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVT8-ZCE9]
(noting that “69% of adults say they are not confident that records of their activity records
maintained by the social media sites that they use will remain private and secure.”).
121 The pursuit of short-term value can also be desired by short-term
shareholders, who may influence executives to take this path. See COLIN MAYER, FIRM
COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT
185–86 (2013) (explaining how short-term shareholders press managers to take steps
that advance their interests).
122 See supra note 76.
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reason is that corporate officers appear to value privacy less
than most people, and thus may underappreciate the magnitude
of users’ privacy concerns.123 New research by Victoria Schwartz
argues that extensive corporate disclosure requirements as well
as media interest in the personal lives of corporate executives
sort the pool of corporate executives towards individuals who do
not highly value privacy.124 Clearly, these are two different kinds
of privacy: classic privacy issues of media attention to an
individual, and processing a massive amount of seemingly
mundane data. Yet the relative indifference of executives to
sharing information about themselves may blind them from
realizing that they overexploit users’ personal information and
drive them to downplay the risk that users will change their
behavior as a result.125
Consider now how including a privacy-based pay
component in compensation deals can curb executives’ incentives
to externalize privacy costs. As mentioned above, executive
compensation packages have traditionally been designed to tackle
the agency problem between officers and shareholders, namely,
the concern that officers would advance their own interests over
those of shareholders.126 Consequently, executive compensation
packages are designed to align executives’ incentives with those
of shareholders, and they typically disregard value or disvalue for
non-shareholder stakeholders, including the privacy interests of
the firm’s users.127
In fact, privacy is the most natural victim of Pay for
Performance programs in the context of social media. Beyond
concerns of compliance and legal risks, privacy has little effect
on the stock price, because users rarely act on privacy harms, at

123 See Victoria L. Schwartz, Corporate Privacy Failures Start at the Top, 57
B.C. L. REV. 1693, 1712 (2016).
124 Id.
125 Similarly, the well-known phenomenon of conformism might make
executives conform with industry norms or with the sales department’s wishes. See, e.g.,
James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner
Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 462 (2004).
126 See supra note 104.
127 The question of whether firms should also be responsible to non-shareholderstakeholders is debated in the scholarship. The extant law, at least that of executive
compensation, reflects the approach that shareholder value should be the firm’s ultimate
aim. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) (“[M]aximizing profits for equity investors assists the other
‘constituencies’ automatically.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why
the USA and Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 198, 202 (2005); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439,
439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).
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least for now.128 Exploiting data to improve ad-targeting may
actually appear to boost performance, despite the long term risks
discussed herein, because advertisers are willing to pay more for
well-targeted ads.129 Because, as explored above, executives are
not likely to fear that any of this is going to change, their focus
is on exploiting users’ data to the fullest, regardless of the harms
users may incur as a result.
Executives’ incentive to disregard user privacy has
empirical support. Studies found that “executives eschew[ ] any
responsibility . . . to proactively identify and address privacy
issues. Aside from complying with laws prescribing corporate
behavior, executives felt their duty was to maintain maximum
flexibility over data use to ensure profitability.”130 Clearly,
compliance does create some incentives to internalize privacy,
whether via FTC fines or the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which can affect the behavior of
multinational firms.131 Yet, compliance alone does not ensure
adequate privacy protection, and smaller firms are not even
likely to invest in compliance.132
Redesigning executive compensation to include privacy
considerations would expose executives to the risks both users
and firm shareholders are bearing due to the trade in users’ data.
This move can thus both remediate externalities and reduce the
managerial agency costs this Part discussed.133
B.

The Mechanism

Part of the compensation of executives in social networks
should be determined by the quality of the privacy protection
See supra Part I.
See Grunes, supra note 39, at 1110–11 (noting that personal information
allows advertisers to target their market and to measure effectiveness).
130 Bamberger & Mulligan, New Governance, supra note 50, at 499. But see
Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 20, at 272 (describing
interviews with Chief Privacy Officers within firms who describe a shift of the privacy
discussion from compliance to risk-management).
131 See sources cited supra notes 25, 40.
132 See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 35, at 380 (analyzing companies’
compliance with privacy laws).
133 Preventing
externalities and furthering the interests of long-term
shareholders can go hand in hand. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate
Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 702
(2006) (“[P]roponents of the long-term view of shareholder primacy would contend that
such a view accommodates non-shareholder issues. . . . because ‘stakeholder’ concerns,
such as giving money to charity or behaving responsibly towards employees and customers,
inure to the benefit of shareholders in the long-term.” (footnotes omitted)); Virginia Harper
Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the ShareholderStakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 62 (2010) (arguing that attention to stakeholder
interests leads to long-term shareholder wealth); see also infra Section III.B.3.
128
129
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that their firm applies. To achieve this, there should be a
mechanism of privacy rating for social networking firms. Privacy
officers in the firm would operationalize this model, and the
firm’s compensation committee would factor this score into
executive compensation packages.
1. The Standard for Privacy
The first—and most prominent—challenge of the model is
how to measure the quality of data protection social networking
firms employ. The analysis of this challenge is guided by two
assumptions. The first is that privacy is neither a static nor a
homogeneous concept. Privacy is a moving target, constantly
evolving with technology, market trends, and social
expectations.134 Privacy preferences are also heterogeneous,
namely some individuals value privacy more than others.135
Second—and notably, though often overlooked—too much privacy
can be as bad as too little. Among other things, too much privacy
can curb innovation (such as in the area of data analytics),
increase access prices to social networks (that are mostly free

134 See Fred H. Cate & Robert Litan, Constitutional Issues in Information
Privacy, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 61 (2002) (“The public’s expectations
of privacy are changing, as are the many influences that shape those expectations,
such as technology, law, and experience.”); Adam Thierer, A Framework for BenefitCost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1101–02 (2013)
(describing a resistance, adaptation, assimilation cycle towards privacy-related
technologies); Jake Nevrla, Commentary, Voluntary Surveillance: Privacy, Identity
and the Rise of Social Panopticism in the Twenty-First Century, 6 COMM-ENTARY 5, 5–6
(2010), https://cola.unh.edu/sites/cola.unh.edu/files/student-journals/Comm-entary2010
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/36DJ-YBUN] (“Societal norms have inevitably adapted to this
new medium of communication and the level of surveillance that has come with it. ”). See
generally ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET (2000) (examining the changing conceptions of
privacy throughout American history).
135 See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 788 (2014)
(“Consumer preferences are also deeply heterogeneous. Some consumers wish for more
privacy while others could not care less.”); Daniel J. Gilman & James C. Cooper, There Is a
Time to Keep Silent and a Time to Speak, the Hard Part Is Knowing Which Is Which:
Striking the Balance Between Privacy Protection and the Flow of Health Care Information,
16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279, 318 (2010) (discussing the heterogeneity of
privacy preferences in the context of health-related data); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as
Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1134–35 (2000) (“Although some individuals
may value privacy so highly that they will choose not to engage in market transactions
about their personal data, others may be quite willing to sell their personal data to firms
A, B, and C (even if not to X, Y, or Z).”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory
of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2026 (2013) (“American attitudes toward privacy
are highly heterogeneous . . . .”); Kay Connelly et al., Do I Do What I Say?: Observed Versus
Stated Privacy Preferences 623 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://link.springer.com/
content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-540-74796-3_61.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8L6-FERM] (measuring
privacy concerns in various computing environments).
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today), and halt the development of novel business models.136 The
task is thus to induce not a static, maximal privacy protection, but
a dynamic standard that would mirror diverse expectations and
evolve with time and with social norms.137
In light of these assumptions, I propose that the criteria
for the rating would not be “objective” nor set by regulation. Nor
should the model reward the most privacy-protective measures.
This article is agnostic as to the “right” level of privacy users
“need,” and is rather concerned more humbly with ensuring that
users’ views of their privacy interests would be taken into
account.138 Thus, the rating should strive to reflect users’ own
views of their privacy interests, as they change over time.
Specifically, I propose to establish a dynamic privacy
rating for social networking firms. The rating would measure
two factors: the first is users’ expectations, namely, are users
surprised when they find out about data practices of their social
networks. The second is users’ satisfaction—are users concerned
about their social network’s data practices. “Surprises” and
“concerns” would be represented in the model as a penalty in the
privacy grade of the platform, to which the executive
compensation would later be linked.
How would “surprises” and “concerns” be calculated? In
general terms, the task of the rating process is twofold. First, to
identify privacy practices that firms engage in—such as using
location services, keeping data perpetually, and using cookies
and other mechanisms to collect data when the product is not in
use.139 Second, to find out whether users are (1) aware of these
practices, and (2) approve of these practices.
Learning about firms’ privacy practices is relatively easy.
These practices are usually public knowledge or inferable from
privacy policies. It is also possible to use technology to reveal some
privacy practices of social media companies. For example, it is
possible to inspect when a service tracks users’ location, and

136 See Strahilevitz, supra note 135, at 2039–40 (“[R]eal-world costs associated
with enhanced privacy” include, for example, “statistical discrimination on the basis of
observable characteristics, anticompetitive behavior, or the imposition of elite
preferences on a populist populace.”). But see Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1918–27 (2013) (arguing that lack of privacy may harm innovation).
137 Cf. Felix T. Wu, The Constitutionality of Consumer Privacy Regulation, 2013
U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 69, 75 (2013) (fostering notice-and-choice “because it avoids a one-sizefits-all approach to privacy and potentially opens the space for companies to serve
consumers’ heterogeneous privacy preferences differently”).
138 Social networks that operate in the global scale may be under obligation to
apply other jurisdictions’ laws as well, such as GDPR. See supra note 40.
139 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 53.
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whether it uses cookies to track users on other websites.140
Technologies can also examine the data protection methods firms
use.141 Such tools can be deployed involuntarily on any website and
can help gather data about privacy practices of social networks.
Next, the rating process would need to seek users’
feedback about the networks’ practices in order to calculate
“surprises” and “concerns.”142 The best way to achieve this would
be to require social networks to survey users about their privacy
practices.143 One option to conduct a survey is to collect users’
perceptions through crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon
Mechanical Turk.144 A better option is to reach users via each
social media directly, and factor the response rate into the rating,
in order to induce social media firms to encourage their users to
respond. It is also possible to reward firms that have a high
response rate and to penalize firms with a low response rate.
Surveys could be complemented by other data. For
example, it is possible to measure the number of times a site’s
privacy policy has been accessed (the more it was accessed, the
lower the “surprise” factor), and the transparency level of
Privacy Policies.145 A recent project by Joel Reidenberg, Jaspreet
Bhatia, and Travis D. Breaux proposes a semantic analysis of
Privacy Policies’ ambiguity, which yields a transparency score
for Privacy Policy documents.146 This score can be factored into
the “surprise” grade of the firm.
140 See, e.g., COOKIE CHECKER, http://www.cookie-checker.com/ [https://perma.cc/
2VCP-RXTY].
141 It may be possible to incorporate rating services that already exist on the
market into the rating. See, e.g., SECURITY SCORECARD, https://securityscorecard.com/
[https://perma.cc/J9KR-EU94].
142 Importantly, the surveys should also capture users’ perception with regard
to the purpose of the practice, because the purpose of collecting data may be material to
users’ perception of it. For example, users may feel comfortable if the network collects
location data in order to deliver location-based services, yet frown upon the collection of
the same data for advertising purposes. See Lin et al., supra note 56, at 199 (“[A] user’s
willingness to grant a given permission to a given mobile app [to use their data] is
strongly influenced by the purpose associated with such a permission.”).
143 Firms may try to manipulate the results by only nudging privacy-indifferent
users to participate in the survey (social networks are likely to know their users’
attitudes towards privacy). Yet this concern is attenuated because privacy-aware users
would need to be nudged less. In any event, sample bias—i.e., the concern that some
members of the intended populations are more likely to be included in the survey than
others—must be taken into account if surveys are conducted. See, e.g., Ann Bowling,
Mode of Questionnaire Administration Can Have Serious Effects on Data Quality, 27 J.
PUB. HEALTH 281, 284 (2005) (discussing sample bias).
144 See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/ [https://perma.cc/
RF42-3PPY].
145 Of course, such a move can also incentivize firms to attract users to their
Privacy Policy.
146 Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Ambiguity in Privacy Policies and the Impact of
Regulation, 45 J. LEGAL STUDIES S163, S176–77 (2016).
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What privacy practices of social networks should the
rating examine? The starting point is that the privacy rating
must be dynamic and examine privacy issues that are relevant
to users, as they change over time. Indeed, the rating criteria
would need to be updated periodically as new privacy challenges
emerge.147 For example, in this day and age it would be
important to examine use of location services and cookies,
among other things. In a year’s time, other issues may become
more important, perhaps moving users’ information to a
blockchain, or connecting users’ information with information
derived from wearable technology.148
How would the rating be calculated? To calculate the
score, a rating agency can average the scores for each factor across
all the networks and use the average score as a baseline.
“Surprises” and “concerns” should have an equal weight in the
final privacy grade. Firms would be ranked based on this average
to determine their privacy score. Firms that would be ranked
above the average would be able to give a bonus to their
executives. Firms that would rank below the average would need
to give a penalty to their executives in their compensation scheme.
Indeed, this mechanism would compare companies to each
other and not to any objective standard. The rationale to use this
comparative mechanism is twofold. First, the comparative
ranking is likely to better generate a vital privacy competition.
Second, I believe that social networks can offer low privacy
protection and be ranked low in this regard—but still have the
right to exist, if users know of this feature in advance and can
plan, for example, what information to share on such platforms.
2. Governance and Facilitation
The second challenge to address is how to govern and
facilitate the rating system. A main question in this regard is
under what umbrella the rating agency should be operating and
how it should be funded. One option is to allocate this task to
private rating companies. This option would resemble existing
147 There are of course issues related to surveys, such as self-selection bias,
question phrasing challenges, social desirability effects, etc. See, e.g., Bowling, supra
note 143, at 283–88 (discussing non-measurement and measurement error that relate to
surveys). Yet there is no reason to believe the same issues would not affect all social
networks equally. It would thus be possible to factor for them when analyzing the results
if they prove to be substantial or to normalize the result. In any case, the survey results
would still provide a substantial improvement over the current regime, where users’
input is not being sought at all.
148 The SEC updates the criteria for incentive-based schemes in other contexts
as well. See, e.g., Pay Versus Performance, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,330 (proposed May 7, 2015).
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rating mechanisms in other industries, such as corporate
governance rating agencies149 or the American hotel industry
rating system.150 Under such models, private, independent
rating bodies issue ratings of players in certain industries based
on criteria they set and charge the companies that they rank.
Applying this model in the social media privacy context
would mean establishing a rating agency for social network
privacy. The rating agency would design the criteria for the
privacy score, collect the data they need, and facilitate and
calculate the rating. The agency would likely be funded by fees
it would collect from the rated social networks themselves.151
It is possible to create more than one rating agency in
order to encourage competition between the rating agencies and
curb the costs they would charge firms for the ranking. There is,
however, a risk that besides price competition, multiple rating
agencies would create a race to the bottom in terms of privacy
standards. Therefore, more than one rating company would only
be desired if the rating companies would not be setting the
rating criteria, an option discussed below.
Another option is to implement the model under the
auspices of the FTC.152 In this option, the FTC would set the
criteria, examine social networking companies’ conduct, and
issue the ranking. A main advantage of this option over the
option of private rating agencies is compliance, because the
FTC’s leadership in the privacy area is well established and its
guidelines and instructions are typically well observed.153
Managing the system at the FTC would also produce
information advantages, as the FTC would gain first-hand and
up to date information about firms’ practices and users’ privacy
149 Corporate governance rating agencies are companies, such as Institutional
Shareholders Service (ISS), that rate corporate governance. See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDERS SERV., https://www.issgovernance.com/ [https://perma.cc/DS2K-JVPJ]. The
rating is used mainly by institutional investors in the investment decision-making process.
150 In the United States, independent rating companies issue the one-to-five
stars rating for hotels and restaurants. See, e.g, About, FORBES TRAVEL GUIDE
https://www.forbestravelguide.com/about [https://perma.cc/94RZ-4N3S] (follow “Learn How
We Inspect”); AAA Travel Guides, AAA https://www.aaa.com/travelguides/ [https://perma.cc/
4WDF-SWBU]. In other countries, the one-to-five star hotel rating system is being facilitated
by governments (France), or by volunteer bodies (Germany). See New Hotel Rating System,
ATOUT FRANCE, https://uk.france.fr/en/holiday-prep/new-hotel-rating-system [https://
perma.cc/3639-Y7F8]; Criteria Hotelstars Union: Excerpt of the Catalogue of Criteria,
HOTELSTARS.EU, https://www.hotelstars.eu/criteria/ [https://perma.cc/66LU-VTWQ].
151 See infra Section III.B.3 for a discussion of voluntary vs. mandatory participation.
152 See, e.g., Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy When We
Buy Now, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 362–65 (2017) (arguing that the FTC is a good fit to
intervene in areas that involve consumer disclosures).
153 See Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 20, at 252, 273–
74 (discussing “the rise of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) role as an ‘activist
privacy regulator’ advancing an evolving consumer-oriented understanding of privacy”).
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interests, which can be used for formulating privacy standards
and policies in other contexts as well.154
On the other hand, managing such a task within a
regulatory body potentially has substantial drawbacks. A key
concern touches on capture and public choice problems.155
Specifically, the FTC may be influenced by industry players,
whose interests (to receive a good rating without changing much
of their operation) would affect the way the agency sets the
criteria and calculates the scores. Capture can have both privacy
and competitive effects, because not only would incumbents
push for lax standards for data use, but they are also likely to
promote standards that would favor them compared to new
entrants, who may lack the political power and capital needed to
influence the agency.156
After weighing the advantages and disadvantages of
private and public mechanisms, the best way to promote the idea
is to create a hybrid private-public model. Under a hybrid
framework, the FTC would be responsible for setting the privacy
criteria to be examined and to supervise the deployment of the
model. The private agencies would be tasked with gathering the
data, calculating the score, and publicizing the ranking. This
way, the FTC review of the rating process is built in to the
system, and there is also a structural distinction between the
standard-setting function and the rating function, as each is
done by a separate entity.
The final step with regard to the facilitation of the model
is to define how social networks themselves would implement
the ranking. Indeed, after the rating company issues the scores,
organs within each firm would need to incorporate the score into
the firm’s executive compensation scheme. This process should
be managed by chief privacy officers (CPOs) or an equivalent
role.157 CPOs would need to decide which executives in the firms
should be subject to this model and have their compensation
154 The decision between these options may perhaps depend on whether our
entire model is voluntary or not. See infra Section III.B.3.
155 See Richard Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
917, 935 n.104 (1985) (“‘Capture’ refers to the tendency of some agencies to favor the
industry they are required to regulate by protecting the industry from outside
competition and stifling innovation that threatens the status quo in the industry.” (citing
Noll, The Behavior of Regulatory Agencies, 9 REV. SOC. ECON. 15 (1971)); Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050
(1997) (“[A]gencies were likely to become ‘captured’ by the business organizations that
they are charged with regulating.”).
156 Examples for such standards may include an excessive focus on data storage
or data management procedures that in fact are relevant mainly for large players.
157 See Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 20, at 261–62
(discussing the position of CPOs).
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affected by the firm’s privacy score. In general, because of the
centrality of privacy decisions in social networking firms on the
product, financial, and policy levels, virtually all executives have
a role in defining the contours of privacy allocated to the firms’
users.158 Thus, absent special considerations, I assume that all
executives in the firms would be subject to this proposal.159 The
compensation committee of the firm would then be tasked with
designing a formula to factor the ranking into the executive
compensation. To prevent manipulation, I propose to include the
executive committee’s work process in the list of items that the
annual external audit is required to examine.160
3. Adoption and Enforcement of the Model
The final challenge is to compel social networking firms
to adopt the model and adequately factor the ranking into their
executive compensation package. There are two options in this
regard. The first is to design the model as an optional, voluntary
framework and hope for social networks to opt in and adopt it
voluntarily. The second option is to impose this model by a
regulatory order (such as an FTC instruction), or to include it in
the FTC’s “best practices,” which are voluntary de jure but
nearly compulsory de facto.161
The voluntary option only resonates if a critical mass of
social networking firms is believed to opt in, because only a
large-scale adoption of the model can reverse the current rush to

158 The notion of Privacy by Design, for example, means that firms need to
consider data protection when designing information technologies and systems. See Ira
S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1409, 1411-12
(2011) (describing privacy by design as “a systematic approach to designing any
technology that embeds privacy into the underlying specifications or architecture.”). The
“Privacy by Design” term was coined by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Ontario, Canada. See ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL
PRINCIPLES (Aug. 2009), https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/resources/7
foundationalprinciples.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHY6-VAJV]; see also FTC 2010 REPORT,
supra note 66, at 39–78 (proposing new frameworks to protect consumer data, in part in
lieu of the ‘privacy by design’ principles); Stuart L. Pardau & Blake Edwards, The FTC,
the Unfairness Doctrine, and Privacy by Design: New Legal Frontiers in Cybersecurity, 12
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 227, 264 (2017) (noting that Ann Cavoukian “introduced the
‘foundational principles’ of [privacy by design] in the mid-1990s.”).
159 For example, the business departments of the firm are responsible for what data
is being sold and for what price; the technological and engineering unit of the company is
responsible for the system design, including the embedded data practices and the default
privacy settings. See sources cited supra note 158 (discussing the privacy by design concept).
160 See discussion infra Section IV.A.
161 Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 20, at 273–74
(discussing the influence of the FTC on decision-making within firms) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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the bottom trend in privacy protection and to inject privacy
competition into the system.
Are firms likely to adopt this model voluntarily?162 On the
one hand, as discussed, an enhanced privacy standard is
consistent with the firm’s long term shareholders’ interests.163 If
managers pursue less protection than shareholders would have
wanted, it should be possible to convince shareholders to adopt
the proposal via a shareholders’ resolution or a “say on pay”
vote.164 To “nudge” firms in this direction, if needed, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can mandate an
annual shareholder vote on whether the company ought to
consider opting in to linking executive pay to privacy ratings.165
On the other hand, there is a gap between the privacy
standard needed to align the interests of executives—the longterm interest of the company—and the privacy standard desired
from a societal point of view, which the model aims at.
Shareholders are far less likely to opt in to a higher privacy
standard that is aimed at curing externalities that the firm
imposes on others (and that shareholders in fact benefit from, at
least in the short term).166 The firm may have some incentive to
opt in in this case, for reputational considerations and signaling
effect (signaling superiority to the users on privacy matters).
And shareholders will have some more incentive to curb such
conduct because of its long-term harm. Yet, these are limited
incentives which are not likely to sufficiently push the needle.167
162 A question may arise as to why shareholders have not adopted such an idea
themselves. The reason may involve the rush to the bottom dynamics with regard to privacy
protection, as Part I discusses, and the well-known overrepresentation of managers’ interests
and positions in firms’ decision-making. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12, at 23–
44 (discussing the management influence on compensation and other issues).
163 See discussion supra Section II.A.
164 “Say-on-pay” is a nonbinding vote on executives’ compensation packages and
is a prevalent tool to control executive pay. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”:
Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 323, 339–40 (2009) (describing shareholder efforts to advance say-on-pay
proposals); Andrew C. W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 122
(2010) (noting that several corporations have voluntarily adopted say-on-pay, often at
shareholders’ active push); see also 2009 Proxy Season Scorecard, RISKMETRICS GROUP
(Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.shareholderforum.com/sop/Library/20091215_RiskMetricsScorecard.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W5R-AFN5] (noting that “say-on-pay” was the most
prevalent shareholder proposal submitted in 2009).
165 Several federal bills have incorporated say-on-pay proposals, though none of
them was implemented so far. See, e.g., Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074,
111th Cong. (2009); Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, H.R. 2861, 111th Cong.
(2009); Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007);
Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S. 1181, 110th Cong. (2007).
166 See Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders,
124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1621 (2015) (“Neither short-term nor long-term shareholder
interests can be counted on to align with the interests of non-shareholder parties.”).
167 See supra Part I.
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In the real world, proposals to tie executive compensation
to goals that do not directly promote shareholders’ interests have
usually proved futile. In the 1990s, proposed resolutions to tie
executive pay to the firm’s social performance, such as
environmental effects, proliferated, but never passed.168 Proxy
advisory service Glass Lewis has fruitlessly recommended linking
short-term incentives to “employee turnover, safety [records],
environmental issues, and customer satisfaction.”169 In Australia,
the ASX Corporate Governance Council has proposed to link
executive compensation to diversity objectives.170 Shareholders’
support for these proposals has been consistently low.171 Granted,
there is more direct benefit for shareholders from my proposal
than from those other examples, because the disregard for privacy
may very well harm firms in the long run.172 Yet, at the end of the
day, shareholders are still unlikely to opt in if the privacy
standard reflects societal interests and not their own.
In case firms would not opt in voluntarily, a regulatory
mandate would be a more promising way forward. The most
straightforward way to achieve that is via a ruling by the FTC that
social networks must participate in the rating process and
incorporate its results into their executive compensation
schemes.173 Alternatively, it would probably be sufficient to include
this model as part of the FTC Best Practices, which are usually
hastily adopted as the industry standard. Under either these “hard
law” or “soft law” mechanisms, all social networking firms would
be involuntarily rated, and companies would be compelled to tie
part of the executive compensation to that privacy rating.174

168 See Lori B. Marino, Comment, Executive Compensation and the Misplaced
Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1205, 1215–
16, 1216 n.69 (1999) (noting that proposals linking executive pay to social performance
“were the most voted on type of proposal in 1997,” but “received the lowest average
support [7%] of any type of proposal.”).
169 See GLASS LEWIS & CO., PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES, 2014 PROXY SEASON: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO P ROXY ADVICE 21 (2014),
http://www.glasslewis.com/assets/uploads/2013/12/2014_GUIDELINES_Canada2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VV29-PT5Y].
170 See
ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (3d ed., 2014), http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asxcompliance/cgc-principles-and-recommendations-3rd-edn.pdf [https://perma.cc/F97K-KXNB].
171 See Marino, supra note 168, at 1215–16.
172 See discussion supra Section II.A.
173 As discussed in Part I, legally speaking, the FTC can be assigned this task
under Section 5, pursuant to their authority to regulate unfair or deceptive practices in
or affecting commerce. As discussed, this authorization that has so far been interpreted
quite broadly. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
174 See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
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The Benefits of the Model

The Pay for Privacy model would boost the overall value
creation of social media. It would motivate an efficient level of
privacy protection in the industry and enhance users’ trust in
social media platforms. In turn, users’ trust would encourage
vibrant use of social media for the benefit of users, social
networks, shareholders, and society as a whole. At the same
time, this model would retain the flexibility to develop novel
business models in the social media industry—including ones
that exploit users’ personal data—as long as privacy interests
are internalized. An additional salutary effect of the model is
informational: prevalent data practices in social media firms, as
well as users’ perceptions of such practices, would come to light.
This information could encourage privacy competition in the
industry, and guide decision-makers in other industries.
First and foremost, the model would create a powerful
incentive for social network executives to internalize users’
interests ex ante, because failing to do so would adversely impact
their compensation ex post. Indeed, factoring users’ interests into
executive compensation schemes would counter the incentive to
trade users’ data whenever doing so would maximize short term
revenues.175 Notably, a key part of the model is that no external
force would be dictating the desired privacy levels. Rather, the
system would be geared towards revealing and satisfying the
privacy standards users themselves are expecting.176
By heeding users’ privacy concerns, the model would
boost users’ trust, and encourage the use of social media in the
long term. Continued use of social media is socially desirable.
Users are the first group of beneficiaries of social networks.
Social networks provide them with a platform to post and
consume content, and to interact with each other.177 But users’
engagement on social networks also produces spillovers on
society as a whole. Social networking fosters speech and
creativity, facilitates inter-personal connections, and generates
opportunities for cooperation and prosperity irrespective of
physical or geographical limitations. Finally, social media
companies and their shareholders would evidently profit from a
See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
Because users are a diverse group with diverse privacy expectations, it
would be possible that different social networks would offer different privacy
expectations, and they would all be acceptable to their users. See Calo, supra note 135,
at 788 (“Consumer preferences are also deeply heterogeneous. Some consumers wish for
more privacy while others could not care less.”).
177 boyd & Ellison, supra note 3; see also supra note 1 (discussing the time
individuals invest in social media, which is an indication of the utility it produces for them).
175
176
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high volume of users and activity on social media. This proposal
would align the interests of executives with all these groups of
beneficiaries, to ensure that users’ privacy concerns would not
jeopardize those benefits.
Another advantage of my model is informational. First,
the model would create, as a byproduct, a transparent privacy
rating of social networks and expose their privacy practices. The
privacy rating of social networking firms would allow users to
understand firms’ privacy offerings without tediously reviewing
complex privacy settings.178 The ability to meaningfully compare
firms on privacy terms could counter the race to the bottom
dynamics previously discussed and inject privacy competition
into the market.179 Moreover, for the first time, executives would
have an incentive to improve privacy disclosure rather than to
keep the matter dormant, because informed users would boost
the “surprises” score. Likewise, firms and their executives would
have an incentive to learn about users’ privacy preferences, in
order to avoid surprises and concerns, which would harm their
privacy score.180
Most importantly, this model would achieve all the above
benefits without curtailing the marketability of personal data.181
Data-based business models are not bad per se. Knowledge about
users can boost efficiency in the retail industry, by preventing
waste in marketing spending and by tailoring products and
services better to users’ needs.182 The model would not prevent
firms from exploring new uses of data. Executives would only be
penalized if these new uses are unacceptable to their users, even
if market failures prevent them from voting on it with their feet.183
Finally, privacy poses a critical threat to other internet
businesses and entities, many of which may also benefit from my
proposal. First, improved privacy standards on social media are
likely to create spillovers to other industries. By providing a lowcost method to communicate user privacy expectations to the
market, more companies are likely to listen to users’ preferences.
Consider also that leading social media firms constantly
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96, 99–100 and accompanying text.
180 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
181 FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? at i
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusio
n-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB9N-R3DT] (“[Data] can
guide the development of new products and services, predict the preferences of individuals,
help tailor services and opportunities, and guide individualized marketing.”).
182 Id.
183 See supra Part I (discussing market failures users are subject to when
attempting to make privacy-related decisions).
178

179
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penetrate additional markets and put out various types of
products and services.184 It is likely that their privacy practices in
the social media space would inform their behavior and policies
in the other new activities. Second, the Fourth Amendment ties
the applicable legal standard of privacy to “reasonable
expectations of privacy,” and so the more users would learn to
expect better privacy terms from online companies the more
privacy they would be entitled to.185 Third, the model can inform
regulatory and enforcement strategies moving forward in a
variety of domains, such as mobile apps, search engines, and
other data-centric digital services.
III.

OBJECTIONS

Three main critiques can be raised against the proposed
model. The first is that the model can be easily manipulated by
firms and executives, and that these manipulations would
thwart its advantages. The second is that this model targets an
imagined problem, because privacy is not an interest the law
needs to protect—in particular in the social networking realm.
The third possible concern is that it is possible to tie executive
compensation to various interests and values, and that the focus
on privacy is unjustified compared to others. Below I analyze
and respond to these arguments.
A.

Manipulations of the Model

One challenge that the model faces is that firms and
executives may manipulate the model in order to receive
bonuses despite actually maintaining low privacy protection.186
Executives would be able to tamper with the reports used to
formulate their firm’s privacy score, report users’ responses
184 For example, Facebook is expanding into the realms of Artificial
Intelligence, virtual reality, and connectivity. See, e.g., Jessica Conditt, Facebook’s
Plans for Oculus Are Finally Taking Shape, ENGADGET (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://www.engadget.com/2017/04/19/facebooks-plans-for-oculus-are-finally-taking-shape/
[https://perma.cc/NS2A-8RKH] (discussing Facebook’s acquisition of Oculus); Mike
Elgan, The Surprising Truth About Facebook’s Internet.org, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 15,
2016, 3:15 AM PT), http://www.computerworld.com/article/3032646/internet/thesurprising-truth-about-facebooks-internetorg.html [https://perma.cc/27AZ-HDC9]
(discussing Facebook’s infrastructure venture Internet.org).
185 See Ohm, supra note 45, at 927 (discussing arguments that were raised in
legal proceedings regarding the lack of “reasonable expectations of privacy” in different
settings (internal quotations omitted)).
186 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 105, at 754 (“[C]ompensation arrangements
approved by boards often deviate from optimal contracting because directors are
captured or subject to influence by management, sympathetic to management, or simply
ineffectual in overseeing compensation.”).
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selectively, refer the surveys only to users who they identify as
privacy indifferent, or ask survey questions in a way that
encourages favorable answers.187 Indeed, especially after the
backdating accounting crisis, executives are not perceived
trustworthy in reporting parameters that affect their pay.188
What is more, the compensation committee of the firm can
design a formula to compensate executives for a pay penalty that
originates from a low privacy score by boosting other parameters
that will increase the bottom line for the executives.189
It is important to note that manipulation of Pay for
Performance schemes are a well-known challenge in corporate
governance, and are in no way specific to this model.190 For
example, ‘correction measures’ to compensate executives for lost
bonuses were observed after the Dodd-Frank act enacted a “sayon-pay” mechanism, which required companies to hold a vote on
executive compensation at least once every three years.191 The
result was that even when companies reduced some aspects of
pay in anticipation of the say-on-pay vote, they offset this by
See supra note 143.
See Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based
Compensation on Misreporting, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 37 (2006) (finding empirically a
correlation between the link of CEO’s option portfolio to stock price and the likelihood to
misreporting). See generally David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards
and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 73 (2000)
(showing that executives manage the timing of voluntary disclosures to manipulate the
stock value—and their options—favorably); John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate
Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 198, 202 (2005)
(showing that executive compensation has a key role in securities fraud); Jared Harris
& Philip Bromiley, Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and
Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation, 18 ORG. SCIENCE 350 (2007)
(analyzing manipulation problems that result from performance-based executive
compensation schemes); David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and
Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997) (also showing that executives
coordinate the timing of disclosures to favorably manipulate stock value and options) .
189 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12, at 67 (discussing how managers’
compensation can be manipulated to augment managers’ rents while appearing
performance-based and thus more defensible); Michael S. Weisbach, Optimal Executive
Compensation Versus Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried’s
Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, 45 J.
ECON. LIT. 419, 425–26 (2007) (showing how firms can disguise benefits to executives in
various ways to make compensation appear more performance-based than it actually is);
see also M.P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate
Grant Dates to Increase Their Compensation?, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 1907 (2008)
(illustrating how firms artificially raise executives’ option value by various practices of
option backdating and option repricing).
190 See, e.g., Bank & Georgiev, supra note 105, at 16 (arguing that even after
the Dodd-Frank Act, Pay for Performance schemes are “ineffectual, counterproductive,
and easy to manipulate”).
191 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n–
1 (2012)) (setting out the say-on-pay requirement); Shareholder Approval of Executive
Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6011 (Feb. 2,
2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–21 (2018)) (establishing the say-on-pay regime).
187
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increasing other components of the compensation package with
the net effect of increased overall pay.192 This model does not fare
worse than the typical Pay for Performance scheme with regard
to manipulation. In fact, this model may have better ways to
address the challenge.
One way to address possible manipulations is already
built into the model. As discussed above, my proposal is to rely as
much as possible on technological and other external factors to
figure out firms’ privacy practices and to determine firms’ privacy
scores, rather than to rely exclusively on the firm’s reporting.193
As discussed, at this time, technology may not (or not yet) be at a
stage to provide all the information needed for formulating the
score. Reliance on the firms’ reporting may still be necessary. Yet
in the long run, I believe that technology can serve as an effective
safeguard against certain manipulations and misapplications of
the model, such as selective surveying and inadequate reporting
of privacy practices. Such tasks can be easily tracked or even
entirely performed with no human involvement.
Another reason that Pay for Privacy Performance is less
prone to manipulation is that it is enforceable by more than one
agency. Specifically, misreporting and other deceptive acts clearly
fall under the FTC jurisdiction, and the agency can impose
sanctions on firms that engage in such practices.194 This regulatory
measure does not only protect users ex post, but also creates an ex
ante incentive for firms and executives to play by the rules.
In addition to the FTC, the SEC can serve as another
enforcement wing, at least with regard to public social network
firms. I propose to include the executive committee’s work
process in the list of items that the external audit is required to
examine.195 Thus, the firm’s auditor would need to confirm that
the firm adequately factored the privacy score into the annual
executive pay. This mechanism would achieve two goals. First,
it would compel executives and the compensation committee to
execute the model adequately. Second, it would allow the SEC to

192 Mathias Kronlund & Shastri Sandy, Does Shareholder Scrutiny Affect Executive
Compensation? 4–5 (Dec. 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2358696 [https://perma.cc/A82R-9464].
193 See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
194 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That
It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm [https://perma.cc/6MAE-2XHM].
195 See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., rule
1001(a)(vii) at 23, (defining the roles of the auditor), effective pursuant to Order
Approving Proposed Rules Relating to Registration System, Exchange Release No. 3450,331, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 87,256 (Sept. 8, 2004).
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supervise the implementation of the proposed model in the case
of public firms as part of other reports the firm submits.196
It is also worth pointing out that even if not all
manipulations are prevented, the model would still provide a
substantial improvement over the current regime. Firms and
executives would still need to check the effects of their actions
on privacy levels and the approval level of users to these
measures, and to justify their actions in a terminology of privacy
protection. This progress bears tremendous importance.
Compelling firms and executives to discern users’ privacy
interests would change the discourse of user privacy. Firms and
executives would need to articulate and defend their practices
on the scope of privacy, rather than pronouncing the whole
question as irrelevant and proclaiming that “privacy is dead.”197
This profound change in discourse is bound to bring along a
change in practice as well.198
B.

Imaginary Privacy Problem

A second criticism my proposal may face is that it is not
aimed at a “real” issue the law needs to tackle. An extreme
version of this critique concerns the lack of a right to privacy in
the first place. Assertions that people with nothing to hide need
not be concerned by the lack of privacy, or that privacy is nothing
but a decaying social norm, abound.199 Even those who value
privacy can be skeptical regarding the focus of the model on
social media companies. After all, social media companies are
private, rather than governmental actors,200 they perform data
196 See Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Rules to Require
Companies to Disclose the Relationship Between Executive Pay and a Company’s
Financial Performance (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/201578.html [https://perma.cc/C4CK-4V2H].
197 The saying that “Privacy is dead” is attributed to Mark Zuckerberg, who
claimed that privacy is no longer a “social norm.” See, e.g., Chi Ling Chan, Privacy Is (Not)
Dead, STAN. DAILY (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.stanforddaily.com/2014/10/07/privacy-isnot-dead/ [https://perma.cc/VU6G-GL92]; see also Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a
Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010), http://www.the
guardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy [https://perma.cc/HKQ3-3M4M].
198 See Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of
Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 534 (2017) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. “may have ramifications” for the fair use
analysis, because copyright owners themselves would begin articulating their answers
in Fair Use terms).
199 Even the status of privacy as a social norm is deteriorating, as people learn
not to expect privacy, in particular when they use the internet, and even more, when
they use social media. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 197 (arguing that privacy is no
longer a social norm).
200 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1211 (2004) (“Suspicion of the state has always stood at the
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analytics mostly on information users submit voluntarily, and
they anonymize the data third parties can access, so that third
parties typically cannot know the identities of the users that
their ads target.201
There is some overlap between my response to this
critique and Part I analysis. In Part I, I argued that legal
intervention is justified because market failures make the social
media privacy space systematically biased against users.202
Here, I complement the picture by showing that privacy has
value both as an intermediate good and as a final good, namely,
for its instrumental value as well as for its own sake.203 I show
that privacy harms can yield considerable welfare loss, and that
such harms are compounded in the context of social networking.
As discussed previously, the costs of inadequate privacy
protection range from the tangible to the intangible. Tangible
privacy risks include, inter alia, fraud, identity theft, stalking,
and harassment.204 Such harms are severe and can have long
term effects on the individuals who experience them as well as
on society as a whole.205
Less tangible privacy risks include discrimination, unfair
treatment, reputational harms, and economic harms, such as
price discrimination and inferior bargaining power.206 For
example, personal data allows social networks and third parties
to provide differential and discriminatory treatment to users,
and vendors who possess disproportional information on
customers can easily grab users’ surplus.207
foundation of American privacy thinking, and American scholarly writing and court
doctrine continue to take it for granted that the state is the prime enemy of our privacy.”).
201 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
202 See supra Part I.
203 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 101–06 (2008).
204 See, e.g., Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW
RES. CTR. (Sept. 5, 2013) http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacyand-security-online/ [https://perma.cc/N7WP-4XJR] (finding that “[eleven percent] of
internet users have had important personal information stolen such as their Social
Security Number, credit card, or bank account information”).
205 See, e.g., FTC 2010 REPORT, supra note 66, at 20.
206 See supra note 92; see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8 (2000) (“Privacy protects us from being misdefined
and judged out of context in a world of short attention spans. . . .”); David S. Ardia,
Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of Defamation Law,
45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 262 (2010) (discussing the inadequacies of defamation law
in an increasingly networked world); Calo, supra note 88, at 999 (“Firms will increasingly
be able to trigger irrationality or vulnerability in consumers . . . .”); Farrell, supra note
33, at 252 (“[L]oss of privacy could identify a consumer as having a high willingness to
pay for something, which can lead to being charged higher prices if the competitive and
other conditions for price discrimination are present.”).
207 See, e.g., Acquisti & Fong, supra note 74 (showing that employers used social
media to discriminate against job candidates).
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Finally, intangible harms—such as harms to dignity,
freedom, and autonomy—result from the fact that sensitive
information about individuals travels away from their control
and may even be used against them.208 While these types of
harms may be the most elusive, they are not by any means the
least significant. The idea of being potentially watched—in
itself—raises levels of discomfort so high that scholars have
articulated it in Orwellian, Kafkaesque, and Bentham’s Big
Brother theory terms.209
In the context of social networking, privacy costs are
dramatically compounded.210 As explained in Part I, social
networks can form a frighteningly detailed profile of their users
at any given moment, and they can do so without users’
intentional disclosure.211 This allows social networks to identify
moments when the users are most depleted or otherwise likely
to show less resistance, and exploit it for advertisers’
advantage.212 Triggering users’ irrationality can also have
political significance. For example, both the Obama and the
Trump campaigns employed behavioral economics to target
users with specific characteristics and to press the right buttons
for each potential voter.213
208 See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131,
1133 (2011) (describing such harm as a the “unwelcome mental states—[such as] anxiety
[or] embarrassment—that accompany the belief” of an individual (or group) that he is
being “watched or monitored”); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L. J.
2087, 2092 (2001) (reviewing JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION
OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000)) (discussing the concepts of dignity, autonomy, and
knowledge); Calo, supra note 88, at 1029.
209 REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: HOW TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS BECOMING
A REALITY 160–61 (1999) (discussing harms that result from data collectors serving as “Big
Brothers”); Kate Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for
the Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 50
(1998) (discussing the “Orwellian overtones” of the online space); James P. Nehf, Recognizing
the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2003) (“[Kafka’s] The Trial
captures the sense of helplessness and vulnerability we may experience when large
bureaucratic organizations—or a multitude of smaller, private ones—collect information
about us and possess the power to use it against our interests.”); Bryan S. Schultz, Comment,
Electronic Money, Internet Commerce, and the Right to Financial Privacy: A Call for New
Federal Guidelines, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 797 (1999) (“[S]ociety inches closer to fulfilling
George Orwell’s startling vision of a nation where ‘Big Brother’ monitors the who, what,
where, when, and how of every individual’s life.”); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396,
1419–23 (2001) (“Commentators have adapted the Big Brother metaphor to describe the
threat to privacy . . . .”).
210 Holland, supra note 37, at 894 (describing privacy ramifications of social networks).
211 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
213 Sasha Issenberg, How Obama’s Team Used Big Data to Rally Voters, MIT TECH.
REV., (Dec. 19, 2012) https://www.technologyreview.com/s/509026/how-obamas-team-usedbig-data-to-rally-voters/ [https://perma.cc/H873-S7UQ]; Philip Bump, All the Ways Trump’s
Campaign Was Aided by Facebook, Ranked by Importance, WASH. POST, (Mar. 22, 2018),
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Privacy costs in the social media context are further
intensified because social networks’ Terms of Service typically
forbid anonymous use or registration under fake identities.214 This
allows the firms to reach individuals with laser-like precision, and
to link information to a specific, real person. Social networks also
track users online outside of the social network site and gather
information about nonusers who visit their sites. What is more,
consolidation in the social network market leads to mass databases
of users being held by a limited number of firms.215 Consolidation
does not only jeopardize competition as discussed in Part I, but also
threatens large scale information leakage.216
Importantly, the fact that social networks keep users’
identities anonymous towards advertisers does not alleviate
privacy concerns one bit.217 Advertisers do not need to know who
the user is in order to flirt with the limits of her ability to act in her
best interests. Imagine an advertiser who requests Facebook to
serve an ad to teens of color who feel insecure and lonely. Knowing
specific identities are immaterial to that marketer’s ability to turn
these characteristics and weaknesses into profit. Marketers can
even harass users on social media unintentionally, by targeting
users for ads that may fit their profiles but at the same time harass
them, as exemplified in the infamous stories of customers who
continue to receive baby-related product ads after miscarriages.218
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/03/22/all-the-ways-trumpscampaign-was-aided-by-facebook-ranked-by-importance/ [https://perma.cc/K5HB-E62Y].
214 See, e.g., Terms of Use, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php
[https://perma.cc/S7PS-W7E6] (requiring users to “use the same name that [they] use in
everyday life” and “provide accurate information about [themselves]”); User Agreement,
LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement [https://perma.cc/7F6G-NPTV]
(“[Y]ou will . . . [p]rovide accurate information . . . [and] [u]se your real name on your
profile.”). Even when users can have anonymous profiles, such as on Tumblr, the firm itself
can and does track a user’s activity. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, TUMBLR, https://
www.tumblr.com/policy/en/privacy [https://perma.cc/K2H5-F8LG].
215 On the tendency of the social networking market to centralize, see supra
notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., Libby Watson, Facebook ‘Bug’ Automatically Leaked Moderators’
Identities to Suspected Terrorists, GIZMODO (June 16, 2017), http://gizmodo.com/facebook-bugautomatically-leaked-moderators-identities-1796164403 [https://perma.cc/WJ8S-CMQ8].
217 See Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
1, 3–4 (2011) (asserting that the dangers of de-anonymization are overstated, and the
benefits of data mining understated). But see Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1703–
04 (2010) (arguing that de-anonymizing is too routine for privacy statutes to exempt
anonymized data from their ambit).
218 See, e.g., Sarah Sluis, (Accidentally) Marketing After a Miscarriage, CRM BLOG
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.destinationcrmblog.com/2014/02/10/accidentally-marketingmiscarriage/ [https://perma.cc/5XTU-9LAS]. Note however that the leading social networks
allow users to block unwanted content, which somewhat alleviates this concern. See, e.g.,
Laura Entis, Facebook Now Lets You Block the Annoying Content Your Friends Want You
to Read, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/231975
[https://perma.cc/QM72-4CY6].
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Notably, the privacy harms discussed have very little to do
with whether an individual is in fact a ‘normative person with
nothing to hide’ or not.219 Despite popular thinking, big data does
not represent an ‘objective truth’ about individuals.220 Clearly social
networks lack incentive to bother to create the most nuanced
account on their users, and are likely to focus on traits that have
commercial value. As a result, ‘normative people with nothing to
hide’ (whatever this term means) are exposed to the same hazards
resulting from the use of their data by social networks.221
To balance the picture, clearly not all uses of personal data
raise these concerns. But uses that occur without taking users’
interests into account are prone to precisely these concerns. The
balance this Article aspires to, namely, to make executives
internalize users’ changing expectations is designed to allow
these transactions to occur as long as interests are internalized.
C.

Why Focus on Privacy?

Privacy is not by any means the only societal implication
of social networks. Nor is it the only pressing societal issue. In
theory, the proposal to harness executive compensation to achieve
societal goals could apply to any other societal goal that firms can
impact. Why then does the proposed model single out privacy?
The short answer is that the proposal is not in principle
limited only to privacy protection. It is theoretically possible to
link executive compensation to other societal goals in order to
tilt the incentives of decision makers to promote them. I do
however think that privacy provides the best test case for such
a move, for multiple reasons. First, the interests of the firm and
the societal interest point in the same direction—increasing
privacy protection. As discussed above, even from shareholders’
point of view, it is shortsighted to exploit users’ data to the
219 Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the
Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 11 (speculating that people do not make themselves aware
of the dangers of online privacy because, inter alia, “[w]e may consider ourselves too
unimportant to be monitored, or feel confident that we have nothing to hide”); DANIEL
SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 1–3
(raising and rebutting the argument that “[i]f you’ve got nothing to hide, you shouldn’t
worry about government surveillance”).
220 See, e.g., Quentin Hardy, Why Big Data Is Not Truth, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2013)
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/why-big-data-is-not-truth/ [https://perma.cc/582QSH8C].
221 See e.g., Sovern, supra note 57, at 1053 (“For example, the incontinent
women who requested free samples may object to disclosure of their condition, not
because they are trying to conceal criminal or immoral conduct or because they wish to
exploit the ignorance of others, but because they fear humiliation if others find out.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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fullest.222 This makes social media privacy a fitting candidate for
such a proposal.
Second, privacy went through a transformation—from
being threatened mainly by governments in the past to being
threatened mainly by private bodies today.223 Still, market tools
are unequipped to deal with privacy because of the market
failures discussed in Part I, and regulation is unlikely to be
effective because of the very dynamic nature of privacy interests.
It makes sense to search for ways to incentivize the market to
work in a way that is more aligned with the societal privacy
interest rather than to impose a top down regulation or to accept
the existing inefficiency of market operation.
Thus, this tool can be extended to other areas that bear a
resemblance to the privacy issue. Such a model can be relevant
in cases where externalities amount, and where the long-term
interest of firms points to the same direction (though perhaps
not in the same magnitude) as the societal interests, yet
executives are still unmotivated to pursue these goals.
CONCLUSION
The privacy debate has generated polarizing views. On
the one end of the continuum, it has been argued that privacy is
an outdated concept, and that “privacy is dead.”224 On the other
tip of the scale, the argument has been that the tracking of and
transactions in individuals’ data is a priori wrong. Linking
executive pay to a company’s privacy protection practices is a
safer middle ground that allows trade in user data on the one
hand but discourages abuse of this data on the other. Common
executive compensation practices produce both an agency
problem and an externality: they push towards less privacy
protection than rationally desired by the owners of social
networks and they externalize privacy costs to users and to
society at large.225
The main advantage of this model is its focus on the
incentives of the actual actors who need to make decisions in real
time as new opportunities and risks that involve users’ data
present themselves. Creating an ex ante incentive for these actors
to act responsively is crucial in the dynamic and rapidly changing
See discussion supra Section II.A.
See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice
in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 536 (1995) (“The private sector has
precisely the type of dossiers that the public has long feared government would abuse.”).
224 See Chan, supra note 197.
225 On the potential distinction between the two issues, see supra Section II.A.
222

223
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landscape of social networking. Indeed, the data-sharing economy
develops rapidly, from mere verbal communication between users
to sharing of physical characteristics (such as pulse and
breathing) and to the unknown future of what today may belong
in science fiction books. These challenges will be better addressed
if the relevant actors in the market are incentivized to tackle
them responsively ex ante than if society attempts to identify the
harms and remedy them ex post. Such an approach will allow
social networking to constantly evolve and grow, while
maintaining users’ integrity and trust. Once implemented
successfully, this approach can also be adopted to other
technological fields that are emerging and ever-changing.

